THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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PREFACE

In March 2006, we published an essay entitled "The Israel Lobby" in The London Review of Books (Vol. 28, No. 6, March 23, 2006). At the suggestion of several well-respected scholars who had read earlier drafts, we also posted a slightly longer and documented version of the article on the Working Paper website of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. We did this so that interested parties could see the sources and evidence on which our conclusions were based.

The response to the two versions of the paper was dramatic. As of mid-July 2006, there had been over 275,000 downloads of the KSG Working Paper version, and a lively (albeit not always civilized) debate was underway. During this period, we were contacted by the editor of Middle East Policy, who sought to publish the documented version. We agreed but asked that we be allowed to revise the Working Paper in response to the comments and criticisms it had provoked.

After considering the responses to our article, we stand by our original arguments. We knew that it would attract criticism, but we have been struck by how weak and ill-founded many of the criticisms have been. We have made minor adjustments in some of the language we employed and corrected a few typographical errors. We have supplemented our arguments in several places to clarify issues that some of our critics either misunderstood or misconstrued, and we have updated a few points in light of subsequent events. In terms of its core claims, however, this revised version does not depart from the original Working Paper.

We are now preparing a detailed "Response to Our Critics" that will formally address and refute the various charges that were leveled at our original article. And we remain convinced that the United States will not be able to deal with the vexing problems in the Middle East if it cannot have a serious and candid discussion of the role of the Israel lobby.
U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe. Nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East, a region of recurring instability and enormous strategic importance. Most recently, the Bush administration's attempt to transform the region into a community of democracies has helped produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, terrorist bombings in Madrid, London and Amman, and open warfare in Gaza and Lebanon. With so much at stake for so many, all countries need to understand the forces that drive U.S. Middle East policy.

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six-Day War in 1967, a recurring feature — and arguably the central focus — of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized U.S. security.

This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United States adopted policies that jeopardized its own security in order to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries is based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives. As we show below, however, neither of those explanations can account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel.

Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due primarily to U.S. domestic politics and especially to the activities of the "Israel lobby." Other special-interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.1

In the pages that follow, we describe how the Israel lobby has accomplished this feat and how its activities have shaped America's actions in this critical region. Given the strategic importance of the Middle East and its potential impact on others, both Americans and non-Americans need to understand and address the lobby's influence on U.S. policy.

Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but most of the facts recounted here are not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account draws primarily on mainstream sources like The New York Times, The Washington Post, Ha'aretz, or Forward. It also relies on the work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great credit for shedding light on these issues. We also cite evidence provided by respected Israeli and international human-rights organizations. Similarly, our claims about the lobby's impact rely on testimony from the lobby's own members, as well as testimony from politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our conclusions, of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.

THE GREAT BENEFACCTOR

Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing the amounts provided
to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct U.S. economic and military assistance since 1976 and the largest total recipient since World War II. Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003 dollars.\textsuperscript{2} Israel receives about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, which is roughly one-fifth of America's foreign-aid budget. In per capita terms, the United States gives each Israeli a direct subsidy worth about $500 per year.\textsuperscript{3} This largesse is especially striking when one realizes that Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to that of South Korea or Spain.\textsuperscript{4}

Israel also gets other special deals from Washington.\textsuperscript{5} Other aid recipients get their money in quarterly installments, but Israel receives its entire appropriation at the beginning of each fiscal year and thus earns extra interest. Most recipients of American military assistance are required to spend all of it in the United States, but Israel can use roughly 25 percent of its aid allotment to subsidize its own defense industry. Israel is the only recipient that does not have to account for how the aid is spent, an exemption that makes it virtually impossible to prevent the money from being used for purposes the United States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank.

Moreover, the United States has provided Israel with nearly $3 billion to develop weapons systems like the Lavi aircraft that the Pentagon did not want or need, while giving Israel access to top-drawer U.S. weaponry like Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 jets. Finally, the United States gives Israel access to intelligence that it denies its NATO allies and has turned a blind eye toward Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 33 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.\textsuperscript{7} It also blocks Arab states' efforts to put Israel's nuclear arsenal on the International Atomic Energy Agency's agenda.\textsuperscript{8}

The United States also comes to Israel's rescue in wartime and takes its side when negotiating peace. The Nixon administration resupplied Israel during the October War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet intervention. Washington was deeply involved in the negotiations that ended that war as well as the lengthy "step-by-step" process that followed, just as it played a key role in the negotiations that preceded and followed the 1993 Oslo accords.\textsuperscript{9} There was occasional friction between U.S. and Israeli officials in both cases, but the United States coordinated its positions closely with Israel and consistently backed the Israeli approach to the negotiations. Indeed, one American participant at Camp David (2000) later said, "Far too often, we functioned . . . as Israel's lawyer."\textsuperscript{10}

As discussed below, Washington has given Israel wide latitude in dealing with the Occupied Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), even when its actions were at odds with stated U.S. policy. Moreover, the Bush administration's ambitious strategy to transform the Middle East — beginning with the invasion of Iraq — was partly intended to improve Israel's strategic situation. The Bush administration also took Israel's side during the recent war in Lebanon and initially opposed calls
for a ceasefire in order to give Israel more time to go after Hezbollah. Apart from wartime alliances, it is hard to think of another instance where one country has provided another with a similar level of material and diplomatic support for such an extended period. America's support for Israel is, in short, unique.

This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for sustained U.S. backing. But neither rationale is convincing.

**A STRATEGIC LIABILITY**

According to the website of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), "The United States and Israel have formed a unique partnership to meet the growing strategic threats in the Middle East . . . . This cooperative effort provides significant benefits for both the United States and Israel." This claim is an article of faith among Israel's supporters and is routinely invoked by Israeli politicians and pro-Israel Americans.

Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War. By serving as America's proxy after the 1967 war, Israel helped contain Soviet expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. Israel occasionally helped protect other U.S. allies (like Jordan's King Hussein), and its military prowess forced Moscow to spend more in backing its losing clients. Israel also gave the United States useful intelligence about Soviet capabilities.

Israel's strategic value during this period should not be overstated, however. Backing Israel was not cheap, and it complicated America's relations with the Arab world. For example, the U.S. decision to give Israel $2.2 billion in emergency military aid during the October War triggered an Arab oil embargo and production decrease that inflicted considerable damage on Western economies. Moreover, Israel's military could not protect U.S. interests in the region. For example, the United States could not rely on Israel when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised concerns about the security of Persian Gulf oil supplies. Washington had to create its own "Rapid Deployment Force" instead.

Even if Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War, the first Gulf War (1990-91) revealed that Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The United States could not use Israeli bases during the war without rupturing the anti-Iraq coalition, and it had to divert resources (e.g., Patriot missile batteries) to keep Tel Aviv from doing anything that might fracture the alliance against Saddam. History repeated itself in 2003. Although Israel was eager for the United States to attack Saddam, President Bush could not ask it to help without triggering Arab opposition. So Israel stayed on the sidelines again.

Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim world, and by a set of "rogue states" that back these groups and seek WMD. For many, this rationale implies that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and with groups like Hezbollah, and not press Israel to make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead. It also implies that the United States should go after countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Bashar al-Assad's Syria. Israel is thus seen as a crucial ally in the war on terror because its enemies are said to be America's enemies.
This new rationale seems persuasive, but Israel is, in fact, a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.

To begin with, "terrorism" is a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist organizations that threaten Israel (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) do not threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or "the West"; it is largely a response to Israel's prolonged campaign to colonize the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More important, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards. Rather, the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. U.S. support for Israel is hardly the only source of anti-American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult. There is no question, for example, that many al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, are motivated in part by Israel's presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. According to the U.S. 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden explicitly sought to punish the United States for its policies in the Middle East, including its support for Israel. He even tried to time the attacks to highlight this issue.15

Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like Bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits. Public-opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply hostile to American support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World found that "citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United States to be playing."17

As for so-called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. Although the United States does have important disagreements with these regimes, Washington would not be nearly as worried about Iran, Baathist Iraq or Syria were it not so closely tied to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear weapons — which is obviously not desirable — it would not be a strategic disaster for the United States. President Bush admitted as much, saying earlier this year that "the threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel."18 Yet this danger is probably overstated in light of Israel's and America's own nuclear deterrents. Neither country could be blackmailed by a nuclear-armed rogue state, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without receiving overwhelming retaliation. The danger of a "nuclear handoff" to terrorists is equally remote. A rogue state could not be sure the transfer would be undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterwards.

Furthermore, the U.S. relationship with Israel makes it harder to deal effectively with these states. Israel's nuclear arsenal is one reason why some of its neighbors want nuclear weapons, and threatening these states with regime change merely increases that desire. Yet Israel is not much of an asset when the United States contemplates using force against these regimes, since it cannot participate in the fight.
In short, treating Israel as America's most important ally in the campaign against terrorism and assorted Middle East dictatorships both exaggerates Israel's ability to help on these issues and ignores the ways that Israel's policies make U.S. efforts more difficult.

Unquestioned support for Israel also weakens the U.S. position outside the Middle East. Foreign elites consistently view the United States as too supportive of Israel and think its tolerance of Israeli repression in the Occupied Territories is morally obtuse and a handicap in the war on terrorism. In April 2004, for example, 52 former British diplomats sent Prime Minister Tony Blair a letter saying that the Israel-Palestine conflict had "poisoned relations between the West and the Arab and Islamic worlds" and warning that the policies of Bush and then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon were "one-sided and illegal." Unqualified U.S. support for Israel's recent assault on Lebanon has elicited similar criticism from many other countries as well.

A final reason to question Israel's strategic value is that it does not act like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders (including past pledges to halt settlement construction and to refrain from "targeted assassinations" of Palestinian leaders). Moreover, Israel has provided sensitive U.S. military technology to potential U.S. rivals like China, in what the U.S. State Department inspector-general called "a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorized transfers." According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, Israel also "conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the U.S. of any ally." In addition to the case of Jonathan Pollard, who gave Israel large quantities of classified material in the early 1980s, a new controversy erupted in 2004, when it was revealed that a key Pentagon official (Larry Franklin) had passed classified information to an Israeli diplomat, allegedly aided by two AIPAC officials. Israel is hardly the only country that spies on the United States, but its willingness to spy on its principal patron casts further doubt on its strategic value.

A DWINDLING MORAL CASE

Apart from its alleged strategic value, Israel's backers also argue that it deserves unqualified U.S. support because 1) it is weak and surrounded by enemies; 2) it is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment; and 4) Israel's conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries' behavior.

On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive. There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, but that is fortunately not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel's past and present conduct offers little moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.

Backing the Underdog?

Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger, better-equipped, and better-led forces during the 1947-49 War of Independence, except for a brief three- to four-week period in May-June 1948, when the Arab armies enjoyed
a temporary advantage in equipment (but nothing else). Moreover, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967 — before large-scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel. These victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational ability and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far from helpless even in its earliest years.

Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors’, and it is the only state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with Israel, and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel's existence. Despite the IDF’s recent difficulties in Lebanon, it is still more than a match for any of the conventional forces in the region and none of its potential adversaries could defeat it on the battlefield and conquer Israeli territory. According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University's prestigious Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, "The strategic balance decidedly favors Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neighbors." If backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would be supporting Israel's opponents.

**Aiding a Fellow Democracy?**

American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a fellow democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S. support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none receives the level of support that Israel does. The United States has overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when this was thought to advance U.S. interests, and it has good relations with a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies nor explains America's support for Israel.

The "shared democracy" rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion or ethnicity are supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state, and whether a citizen is regarded as Jewish ordinarily depends on kinship (i.e., verifiable Jewish ancestry). Given the priority attached to Israel's Jewish character (which explains its longstanding commitment to maintaining an unchallenged Jewish majority within its territory), it is not surprising that Israel's 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second-class citizens or that a recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a "neglectful and discriminatory" manner towards them.

Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens to become citizens themselves and does not give these spouses the right to live in Israel. The Israeli human-rights organization B'tselem called this restriction "a racist law that determines who can live here according to racist criteria." Such laws may be understandable, given Israel's
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America's image of democracy. Israel's democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied full political rights, and the "shared democracy" rationale is correspondingly weakened.

Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the Christian West, especially the tragic experience of the Holocaust. Because Jews were persecuted for centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the United States.

There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy of antisemitism, and that Israel's creation was an appropriate response to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence. Israel's founding was also consistent with America's general commitment to national self-determination. But the creation of Israel also involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the Palestinians.

The history of these events is well-documented. When political Zionism began in earnest in the late nineteenth century, there were only about 15,000 Jews in Palestine. In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95 percent of the population, and, though under Ottoman control, they had been in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years. Even when Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine's population and owned 7 percent of the land.

The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a bi-national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As David Ben-Gurion put it in the summer of 1937, "After the formation of a large army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine." This ambition did not change after 1937 or even after Israel was founded in 1947-48. According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, "Zionist mainstream thought had always regarded a Jewish state from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River as its ultimate goal. The vision of 'Greater Israel' as Zionism's ultimate objective did not end with the 1948 war."

To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply no other way to accomplish their objective, as the Arabs were unlikely to give up their land voluntarily. Ben-Gurion saw the problem clearly, writing in 1941 that "it is impossible to imagine general evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal compulsion." Or, as he wrote his son Amos in October 1937, "We shall organize a modern defense force, ...and then I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some other means." As Morris puts it, "The consensus or near consensus in support of transfer — volun-
tary if possible, compulsory if necessary —
was clear. Nor, as some critics have
contended, did interest in and support for
transfer end or wane when the British
government in effect dropped the idea...in
October 1938."38

This opportunity came in 1947-48,
when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.39 Israeli officials
have long claimed that the Arabs fled
because their leaders told them to, but
careful scholarship (much of it by Israeli
historians like Morris) has demolished this
myth. In fact, most Arab leaders urged the
Palestinian population to stay home, but
fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist
forces led most of them to flee.40 After
the war, Israel barred the return of the
Palestinian exiles.

The fact that the creation of Israel
entailed a moral crime against the Palestin-
ian people was well understood by Israel's
leaders. As Ben-Gurion told Nahum
Goldmann, president of the World Jewish
Congress,

If I was an Arab leader, I would never
make terms with Israel. That is natural:
we have taken their country. Sure,
God promised it to us, but what does
that matter to them? Our God is not
theirs. We come from Israel, it's true,
but two thousand years ago, and what
is that to them? There has been
antisemitism, the Nazis, Hitler,
Auschwitz, but was that their fault?
They only see one thing: we have
come here and stolen their country.
Why should they accept that?41

Since then, Israeli leaders have repeat-
edly sought to deny the Palestinians' national ambitions.42 Prime Minister
Golda Meir famously remarked that "there
was no such thing as Palestinians," and
even Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who
signed the 1993 Oslo accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full-fledged Palestinian
state.43 Pressure from extremist Palestinian
and the growing Palestinian population has
forced subsequent Israeli leaders to
disengage from some of the Occupied
Territories and to explore territorial com-
promise, but no Israeli government has
been willing to offer the Palestinians a
viable state of their own. Even Prime
Minister Ehud Barak's purportedly gener-
ous offer at Camp David in July 2000
would only have given the Palestinians a
disarmed and dismembered set of
"Bantustans" under de facto Israeli
control.44

Europe's crimes against the Jews
provide a strong moral justification for
Israel's right to exist. But Israel's survival
is not in doubt, even if some Islamic
extremists harbor unrealistic hopes or
make outrageous references to "erasing
Israel from the map of time."45 More
important, the tragic history of the Jewish
people does not obligate the United States
to help Israel no matter what it does today.

"Virtuous Israelis" versus "Evil
Arabs"

The final moral argument portrays
Israel as a country that has sought peace
at every turn and showed great restraint
even when provoked. The Arabs, by
contrast, are said to have acted with great
wickedness. This narrative — which is
endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and
American apologists such as Alan
Dershowitz — is yet another myth.46 In
terms of actual behavior, Israel's conduct is
not morally distinguishable from the actions
of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent towards the Palestinian Arabs. The Arab inhabitants did resist the Zionists' encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists responded vigorously, and neither side owns the moral high ground during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including executions, massacres and rapes by Jews. Such atrocities have taken place in many wars, of course, but their occurrence in this period undercuts Israel's claim to a special moral status.

Furthermore, Israel's subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli security forces killed between 2,700 and 5,000 Arab infiltrators, the overwhelming majority of them unarmed. The IDF conducted numerous cross-border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and, though these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually part of a broader effort to expand Israel's borders. Israel's expansionist ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in 1956. Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face of intense U.S. pressure.

The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners of war in both the 1956 and 1967 wars. In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000 Palestinians from the newly conquered West Bank and drove 80,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights. It was also complicit in the massacre of 700 innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. An Israeli investigatory commission found then-Defense Minister Sharon "personally responsible" for these atrocities. The commission's willingness to hold a top official like Sharon accountable is admirable, but we should not forget that Israeli voters subsequently elected him prime minister.

Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners, systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the first intifada (1987-91), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian protestors. The Swedish "Save the Children" organization estimated that "23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifada," with nearly one-third sustaining broken bones. It also estimated that "nearly one-third of the beaten children were aged ten and under."

Israel's response to the second intifada (2000-05) has been even more violent, leading Ha'aretz to declare that "the IDF … is turning into a killing machine whose efficiency is awe-inspiring, yet shocking." The IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, hardly a measured response. Since then, Israel has killed 3.4 Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed is even higher (5.7 to one). Israeli forces have also killed several foreign peace activists, including a 23-year-old American woman crushed by
an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.58 These facts about Israel's conduct have been amply documented by numerous human-rights organizations — including prominent Israeli groups — and are not disputed by fair-minded observers. That is the reason four former officials of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic-security organization) condemned Israel's conduct during the second intifada in November 2003. One of them declared, "We are behaving disgracefully," and another termed Israel's conduct "patently immoral."59

A similar pattern can be seen in Israel's response to the recent escalation in violence in Gaza and Lebanon. The killing of two Israeli soldiers (and the capture of a third) by Hamas led to a massive reprisal that killed dozens of Palestinians (most of them innocent civilians) and destroyed essential infrastructure throughout Gaza. Similarly, after Hezbollah units captured or killed several IDF soldiers near the Israeli-Lebanese border, Israel unleashed a massive air and artillery offensive that killed hundreds of innocent Lebanese civilians, forced hundreds of thousands more to flee their homes, and destroyed millions of dollars worth of property.

But isn't Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens? Doesn't the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even if Israel often responds harshly?

In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either. Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and their willingness to attack innocent civilians is clearly wrong and should be roundly condemned. This behavior is not surprising, however, because the Palestinians have long been denied basic political rights and believe they have no other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he "would have joined a terrorist organization." 60 If the situation were reversed, and the Israelis were under Arab occupation, they would undoubtedly be using similar tactics against their oppressors, just as other resistance movements around the world have done.

Indeed, terrorism was one of the key tactics the Zionists used when they were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their own state. Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist bombings to drive the British from Palestine and took the lives of many innocent civilians along the way.61 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal to internationalize Jerusalem.62 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually granted amnesty by the Israeli government; one of them was elected to the Knesset.
Another terrorist leader, who approved Bernadotte's murder but was not tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly argued that "neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat." Rather, terrorism had "a great part to play in our war against the occupier [Britain]." 63 If the Palestinians' use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel's reliance upon it in the past. Thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel on the grounds that its prior conduct was morally superior.64

Similarly, although Israel is clearly justified in responding to violent acts by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, its willingness to inflict massive suffering on innocent civilians casts doubt on its repeated claims to a special moral status. Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it clearly has not acted any better.

THE ISRAEL LOBBY

If neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America's support for Israel, how are we to explain it? The explanation lies in the political power of the Israel lobby. Were it not for the lobby's ability to work effectively within the American political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today.

What Is the Lobby?

We use "the lobby" as a convenient short-hand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to suggest that "the lobby" is a unified movement with a central leadership or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues. The lobby is not a cabal or conspiracy, and its activities are essentially consistent with the interest-group tradition that has long governed American political life.

The core of the lobby consists of American Jews who make a significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel's interests.65 Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro-Israel to include writing letters, contributing money and supporting pro-Israel organizations. But the lobby is not synonymous with American Jews. Israel is not a salient issue for many of them, and many do not support the lobby's positions. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent of Jewish-Americans said they were either "not very" or "not at all" emotionally attached to Israel.66 Moreover, some groups that work on Israel's behalf — such as the "Christian Zionists" discussed below — are not Jewish.

Jewish-Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organizations in the lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, are run by hardliners who generally supported the expansionist policies of Israel's Likud party, including its hostility to the Oslo peace process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians, and a few groups — such as Jewish Voice for Peace — strongly advocate such steps.67 Despite these differences, the majority of organized groups in the American Jewish community favor steadfast U.S. support for Israel.

Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli officials.
so that the former can maximize their influence in the United States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, 'It is routine for us to say: 'This is our policy on a certain issue, but we must check what the Israelis think.' We as a community do it all the time.' There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy, and Jewish-American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel. Thus, Edgar Bronfman, Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was accused of "perfidy" when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid-2003 urging him to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial "security fence." Critics declared, "It would be obscene at any time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president of the United States to resist policies being promoted by the government of Israel."

Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a critical border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his action as "irresponsible behavior" and declared, "There is absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing against the security-related policies . . . of Israel."

Recoiling from these attacks, Reich proclaimed, "The word pressure is not in my vocabulary when it comes to Israel."

Jewish-Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and well-known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington. AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP) but ahead of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association (NRA). A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in Washington's "muscle rankings."

The lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. These "Christian Zionists" believe Israel's rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God's will.

In addition, the lobby also draws support from neoconservative gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick and columnist George Will.

**Sources of Power**

The United States has a divided government that offers many avenues for influencing the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape policy in many different ways: lobbying elected representatives and members of the Executive Branch, making campaign contributions, voting in elections, molding public opinion, etc.

Furthermore, special-interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the population is indifferent. This is often the case in foreign affairs. Policy makers will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel lobby's power flows from its unmatched ability to play this game of interest-group politics. In its basic operations, it is no different from the farm lobby, the NRA, steel and textile-workers groups, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel lobby apart is its extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards Israel. To repeat: the lobby's activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in antisemitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise the lobby are doing what other special-interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro-Arab interest groups are weak to non-existent, which makes the lobby's task even easier.75

**Strategies for Success**

The lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel. First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the Executive Branch to support Israel down the line. Whatever an individual lawmaker or policy maker's own views, the lobby tries to make supporting Israel the "smart" political choice.

Second, the lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its founding and by publicizing Israel's side in the policy debates of the day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a candid discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.

**Influencing Congress**

A key pillar of the lobby's effectiveness is its influence in the U.S. Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative action, health care or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall silent; there is hardly any debate at all.

One reason for the lobby's success with Congress is that some key members are "Christian Zionists" like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002, "My number-one priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel."76 One would think that the number-one priority for any congressman would be to "protect America," but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel's interests.

Pro-Israel congressional staffers are another source of the lobby's power. As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once noted, "There are a lot of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] … who happen to be Jewish, who are willing … to look at certain issues in terms of their Jewishness …. These are all guys who are in a position to make the decision in these areas for those senators …. You can get an awful lot done just at the staff level."77

It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the lobby's influence in Congress.78 AIPAC's success is due to its ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its agenda and to punish those who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent scandal over lobbyist Jack
Abramoff’s various shady dealings reminds us, and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get financial support from the myriad pro-Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes letter-writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse pro-Israel candidates.

There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one example, in 1984, AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois, who, according to one prominent lobby figure, had "displayed insensitivity and even hostility to our concerns." Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at the time, explained what happened: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians — those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire — got the message." 79 Other U.S. politicians who have felt AIPAC’s wrath include former representatives Paul Findley (R-IL), Pete McCloskey (R-CA), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), and James Moran (D-VA), just to name a few. 80 One could also include Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY), whose support for Palestinian statehood and public embrace of Suha Arafat (wife of Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat) provoked strong criticism from groups in the lobby. Not surprisingly, Clinton became an ardent defender of Israel once she began running for office herself. 81 AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because this discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.

AIPAC’s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, "It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts." 82 More important, he notes that AIPAC is "often called upon to draft speeches, work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co-sponsors and marshal votes."

The bottom line is that AIPAC, which bills itself as "America’s Pro-Israel Lobby," has an unchallenged hold on the U.S. Congress. 83 Open debate about U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) noted as he was leaving office, "You can't have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here." 84 Small wonder that former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once told an American audience, "When people ask me how they can help Israel, I tell them — help AIPAC." His successor, Ehud Olmert, agrees, remarking, "Thank God we have AIPAC, the greatest supporter and friend we have in the whole world." 85

**Influencing the Executive**

The lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive Branch. That power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population (less than 3 percent), Jewish-Americans make large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. The *Washington Post* once estimated that Demo-
ocratic presidential candidates "depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 percent of the money." Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn-out rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. This increases their weight in determining electoral outcomes. Because they matter in close elections, presidential candidates try not to antagonize Jewish voters.

Key organizations in the lobby also directly target the administration in power. For example, pro-Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish state do not get important foreign-policy appointments. Jimmy Carter wanted to make George Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the lobby would oppose the appointment. This litmus test encourages any aspiring policy maker to become an overt supporter of Israel (or at the very least, to refrain from criticizing U.S. support for Israel). Thus, public critics of Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more "even-handed role" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of selling Israel down the river and said his statement was "irresponsible." Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House of Representatives signed a hard-hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and The Chicago Jewish Star reported that "anonymous attackers ... are clogging the e-mail inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning — without much evidence — that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel." This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on Israel. His campaign co-chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of AIPAC than of the more moderate Americans for Peace Now. Dean had merely suggested that to "bring the sides together," Washington should act as an honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even-handedness when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The lobby's goals are also served when pro-Israel individuals occupy important positions in the Executive Branch. During the Clinton administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro-Israel organizations — including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC and co-founder of the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often visits there. These men were among President Clinton's closest advisors at the Camp David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel. In particular, the American delegation took most of its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, coordinated negotiating positions with Israel in advance, and did not offer its own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly, Palestinian negotiators complained that
they were "negotiating with two Israeli teams — one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American flag." 93

The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush administration, whose ranks have included fervently pro-Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by organizations in the lobby.

Manipulating the Media

In addition to influencing government policy directly, the lobby strives to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organizations work hard to influence the media, think tanks and academia, institutions that are critical in shaping popular opinion.

The lobby's perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream media, in good part because most American commentators are pro-Israel. The debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is "dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel." 94 He lists 61 "columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel reflexively and without qualification." Conversely, Alterman found just five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse pro-Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op-eds challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the other side.

This pro-Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers. Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked, "Shamir, Sharon, Bibi — whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me." 95 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent newspapers like The Chicago Sun-Times and The Washington Times, regularly run editorials that are strongly pro-Israel and rarely publish editorials that criticize it. Magazines like Commentary, The New Republic and The Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at every turn.

Editorial bias is also found in papers like The New York Times. The Times occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes acknowledges that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even-handed.96 In his memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel recounted the impact his own pro-Israel attitude had on his editorial choices: "I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert." He goes on, "Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them from a pro-Israel perspective." 97

The media's reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more even-handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the Occupied Territories without acknowledging Israel's actual behavior. To discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the lobby organizes letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations and boycotts against news outlets whose content it considers anti-Israel. One CNN executive has said that he sometimes gets 6,000 e-mail messages in a single day complaining...
that a story is anti-Israel.98 Similarly, the pro-Israel Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003. It also tried to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle East coverage became more sympathetic to Israel.99 Boston’s NPR station, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel’s friends in Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more oversight of its Middle East coverage.

These factors help explain why the American media offer few criticisms of Israeli policy, rarely question Washington’s unconditional commitment to Israel, and only occasionally discuss the lobby’s influence on U.S. policy.

Think Tanks That Think One Way

Pro-Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The lobby created its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.100 Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it provides a “balanced and realistic” perspective on Middle East issues, this is not the case.101 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals who are deeply committed to advancing Israel’s agenda.

The lobby’s influence in the think-tank world extends well beyond WINEP. Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Brookings Institution, the Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro-Israel and include few, if any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.

A good indicator of the lobby’s influence in the think-tank world is the evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and former NSC official with a well-deserved reputation for evenhandedness regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, however, work on these issues at Brookings is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli-American businessman and ardent Zionist.102 The director of the Saban Center is the ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Although it occasionally hosts Arab experts and tolerates some divergence of opinion, Saban Center publications never question U.S. support for Israel and rarely, if ever, offer significant criticisms of key Israeli policies. In sum, what was once a non-partisan policy institute on Middle East matters has moved in a decidedly pro-

[The Lobby] does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently provide.
Thus, the balance of power inside the Beltway strongly favors Israel. There are a few think tanks that are not reflexively pro-Israel (e.g., the New America Foundation, the CATO Institute, the Middle East Institute), but the largest and most visible think tanks usually take Israel's side and do not question the merits of unconditional U.S. support.

**Policing Academia**

The lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon came to power in early 2001. It became especially intense when the IDF reoccupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force against the second intifada.

The lobby moved aggressively to "take back the campuses." New groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to U.S. colleges. Established groups such as the Jewish Council for Public Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new entity — the Israel on Campus Coalition — was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought to make Israel's case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young advocates for Israel, in order to "vastly expand the number of students involved on campus ... in the national pro-Israel effort." The lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, for example, Daniel Pipes, a passionately pro-Israel neoconservative, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel. This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted such a harsh reaction that Pipes later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites students to report alleged anti-Israel behavior at U.S. colleges.

Groups in the lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target of pro-Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported, "One can be sure that any public statement in support of the Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said will elicit hundreds of e-mails, letters and journalistic accounts that call on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him." When Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of Chicago, Cole says that "the complaints started flowing in from people who disagreed with the content of his political views." Princeton faced the same problem a few years later when it considered trying to woo Khalidi away from Columbia.

A similar pattern occurred again in 2006, when the departments of History and Sociology at Yale University voted to appoint Professor Juan Cole, a distinguished historian at the University of Michigan. Cole is also the author of a prize-winning weblog ("Informed Comment") and has criticized a number of Israeli policies in recent years. His appointment was attacked by pro-Israel
columnists in *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Washington Times*. The newspaper *Jewish Week* reported that several prominent Jewish donors called Yale officials in order to protest the appointment, which was subsequently overturned by the University’s appointments committee. The impact of this alleged donor pressure is unknown, but the incident underscores the importance that Israel's supporters now attach to shaping discourse on campus.108

A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late 2004, when the "David Project" produced a propaganda film alleging that faculty in Columbia University's Middle East studies program were antisemitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.109 Columbia was raked over the coals in pro-Israel circles, but a faculty committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of antisemitism. The only incident worth noting was the possibility that one professor had "responded heatedly" to a student's question.110 The committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target of an overt intimidation campaign.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewish groups to push Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about Israel.111 Schools judged to have an anti-Israel bias would be denied federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses has not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance pro-Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.

Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel-friendly scholars on campus.112 NYU announced the establishment of the Taub Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been established at other universities like Berkeley, Brandeis and Emory. Academic administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but they are intended in good part to promote Israel's image on campus. Fred Lafer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the "Arabie [sic] point of view" that he thinks is prevalent in NYU's Middle East programs.113

In sum, the lobby has gone to considerable lengths to protect Israel from criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism of Israel by professors and students, and there is much less of it on campuses today.114

**The Great Silencer**

No discussion of how the lobby operates would be complete without examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of antisemitism. Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy — an influence that AIPAC celebrates — stands a good chance of getting labeled an antisemite. In fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel lobby runs the risk of being charged with antisemitism, even though the Israeli media frequently refer to America's "Jewish lobby."115 In effect, the lobby boasts of its own power and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very effective; antisemitism is
loathsome, and no responsible person wants to be accused of it.

Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli policy in recent years. Some attribute this to a resurgence of antisemitism in Europe. We are "getting to a point," the U.S. ambassador to the European Union said in early 2004, "where it is as bad as it was in the 1930s." 116 Measuring antisemitism is a complicated matter, but the weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the spring of 2004, when accusations of European antisemitism filled the air in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the Anti-Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press showed that it was actually declining. 117

Consider France, which pro-Israel forces often portray as the most antisemitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe making antisemitic graffiti is a serious crime; 87 percent think attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in business and finance. 118 It is unsurprising that the head of the French Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that "France is not more antisemitic than America." 119 According to a recent article in Ha'aretz, the French police report that antisemitic incidents in France declined by almost 50 percent in 2005, despite the fact that France has the largest Muslim population of any country in Europe. 120

Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered by a Muslim gang in February 2006, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to condemn antisemitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim's memorial service in a public show of solidarity with French Jewry. 121 It is also worth noting that, in 2002, more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it "the fastest growing Jewish community in the world," according to an article in the Jewish newspaper Forward. 122 If Europe were really heading back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there in large numbers.

We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of antisemitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent autochthonous antisemites in Europe (as there are in the United States), but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is antisemitism among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel's behavior towards the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 123 This problem is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less than five percent of Europe's total population, and European governments are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject such hateful views. 124 In short, when it comes to antisemitism, Europe today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.

This is why pro-Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim that there is a "new antisemitism," which they equate with criticism of Israel. 125 In other words, criticize Israeli policy, and you are by definition an antisemite. When the synod of the Church of England voted to
divest from Caterpillar Inc. on the grounds that the company manufactures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes, the Chief Rabbi complained that it would "have the most adverse repercussions on ... Jewish-Christian relations in Britain," while Rabbi Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: "There is a clear problem of anti-Zionist — verging on anti-Semitic — attitudes emerging in the grass roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church." However, the Church was guilty of neither anti-Zionism nor antisemitism; it was merely protesting Israeli policy.

Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they question its behavior towards the Palestinians. This is a legitimate criticism; Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism because it is contrary to widely accepted human-rights norms and international law, as well as the principle of national self-determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp criticism on these grounds.

This discussion of a powerful lobby working to move U.S. policy in a pro-Israel direction is bound to make some people uncomfortable, because it seems to invoke the spectre of "dual loyalty," a familiar antisemitic canard in old Europe. We reject this view wholeheartedly and do not believe that Americans who lobby on Israel's behalf are in any way disloyal. Rather, we recognize that all individuals have many attachments — to country, religion, family, employer, etc. — and that in the United States, it is legitimate to express these attachments in politics. In other words, it is neither improper nor illegitimate for Americans to advocate policies they believe will benefit both the United States and Israel.

But it is equally legitimate for others to point out that groups like AIPAC and the individuals who press Israel's case have a commitment to Israel that shapes their thinking about many foreign-policy issues. Why else would Malcolm Hoenlein, the driving force behind the powerful Conference of Presidents, describe his job as follows: "I devote myself to the security of the Jewish state"? It should be legitimate for others to discuss the influence of these groups and to question whether their prescriptions are the right ones without being smeared as antisemites.

In sum, although there are a great many special-interest groups in the United States, most of them can only dream of having the political muscle that pro-Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is this: What effect does the Israel lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?

THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG

If the lobby's impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as useful as having the world's only superpower bring its vast capabilities to bear on Israel's behalf. Accordingly, the lobby has also sought to
shape the core elements of U.S. Middle East policy. In particular, it has worked successfully to convince American leaders to back Israel's continued repression of the Palestinians and to take aim at Israel's primary regional adversaries — Iran, Iraq, and Syria — as well as groups like Hezbollah.

**Demonizing the Palestinians**

It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in the spring of 2002, the Bush administration made a brief attempt to reduce anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, by halting Israel's expansionist policies in the Occupied Territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state.

Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have threatened to reduce U.S. economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and the American people would almost certainly have supported him. A May 2003 poll reported that over 60 percent of Americans were willing to withhold aid to Israel if it resisted U.S. pressure to settle the conflict; that number rose to 70 percent among "politically active" Americans. Indeed, 73 percent said that United States should not favor either side.

Yet the Bush administration failed to change Israel's policies, and Washington ended up backing Israel's hard-line approach instead. Over time, the administration also adopted Israel's justifications for this approach, so that U.S. and Israeli rhetoric became similar. By February 2003, a *Washington Post* headline summarized the situation: "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy." The lobby's influence was a central part of this switch.

The story begins in late September 2001, when President Bush began pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to show restraint in the Occupied Territories. He also pressed Sharon to allow Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to meet with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, even though Bush was highly critical of Arafat's leadership. Bush also said publicly that he supported a Palestinian state. Alarmed by these developments, Sharon accused Bush of trying "to appease the Arabs at our expense," warning that Israel "will not be Czechoslovakia." 133

Bush was reportedly furious at Sharon's likening him to Neville Chamberlain, and White House press secretary Ari Fleischer called Sharon's remarks "unacceptable." The Israeli prime minister offered a pro forma apology, but he quickly joined forces with the lobby to convince the Bush administration and the American people that the United States and Israel faced a common threat from terrorism. Israeli officials and lobby representatives repeatedly emphasized that there was no real difference between Arafat and Osama bin Laden, insisting that the United States and Israel should isolate the Palestinians' elected leader and have nothing to do with him. 136

The lobby also went to work in Congress. On November 16, eighty-nine senators sent Bush a letter praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding that the United States not restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians and insisting that the administration state publicly that it stood steadfastly behind Israel. According to *The New York Times*, the letter "stemmed from a meeting two weeks ago between leaders of the American Jewish community and key senators," adding that AIPAC was
"particularly active in providing advice on the letter."  

By late November, relations between Tel Aviv and Washington had improved considerably. This was due in part to the lobby's efforts to bend U.S. policy in Israel's direction, but also to America's initial victory in Afghanistan, which reduced the perceived need for Arab support in dealing with al-Qaeda. Sharon visited the White House in early December and had a friendly meeting with Bush.  

Trouble erupted again in April 2002, however, after the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all the major Palestinian areas on the West Bank.  

William Kristol, who accused him of having "virtually obliterated the distinction between terrorists and those fighting terrorists."  

A second target was Bush himself, who was being pressed by Jewish leaders and Christian evangelicals, the latter a key component of his political base. Tom DeLay and Dick Armey were especially outspoken about the need to support Israel, and DeLay and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott visited the White House and personally warned Bush to back off.  

The first sign that Bush was caving came on April 11 — only one week after he told Sharon to withdraw his forces — when Ari Fleischer said the president believes Sharon is "a man of peace."  

Bush repeated this statement publicly upon Powell's return from his abortive mission, and he told reporters that Sharon had responded satisfactorily to his call for a full and immediate withdrawal.  

Pressure from Israel and the lobby was not the only factor behind the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was a critical element.  

Meanwhile, Congress was also moving to back Sharon. On May 2, it overrode the administration's objections and passed two resolutions reaffirming support for Israel. (The Senate vote was 94-2; the House version passed 352-21.) Both resolutions emphasized that the United States "stands in solidarity with Israel" and that the two countries are, to quote the House resolution, "now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism." The House version also condemned "the ongoing support of terror by Yasir Arafat," who was portrayed as a
central element of the terrorism prob-
lem. A few days later, a bipartisan
congressional delegation on a fact-finding
mission in Israel publicly proclaimed that
Sharon should resist U.S. pressure to
negotiate with Arafat. On May 9, a
House appropriations subcommittee met to
consider giving Israel an extra $200 million
to fight terrorism. Secretary of State
Powell opposed the package, but the lobby
backed it, just as it had helped write the two
congressional resolutions. Powell lost.

In short, Sharon and the lobby took on
the president of the United States and
triumphed. Hemi Shalev, a journalist for
the Israel newspaper *Ma’ariv*, reported
that Sharon’s aides "could not hide their
satisfaction in view of Powell’s failure.
Sharon saw the white in President Bush’s
eyes, they bragged, and the president blinked
first." But it was the pro-Israel forces in
the United States, not Sharon or Israel, that
played the key role in defeating Bush.

The situation has changed little since
then. The Bush administration refused to
deal further with Arafat, who eventually died
in November 2004. It subsequently em-
braced the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud
Abbas, but has done virtually nothing to help
him gain a viable state. Sharon continued to
develop his plans for unilateral "disengage-
ment" from the Palestinians, based on
withdrawal from Gaza coupled with contin-
ued expansion on the West Bank, which
entails building the so-called "security fence,"
seizing Palestinian-owned land, and expand-
ing settlement blocks and road networks. By
refusing to negotiate with Abbas (who has
recognized Israel, renounced terrorism and
favors a negotiated settlement) and making it
impossible for him to deliver tangible benefits
to the Palestinian people, Sharon's strategy
contributed directly to Hamas's electoral
victory. With Hamas in power, of course,
Israel has another excuse not to negotiate.
The administration has supported Sharon's
actions (and those of his successor, Ehud
Olmert), and Bush has even endorsed
unilateral Israeli annexations in the Occupied
Territories, reversing the stated policy of
every president since Lyndon Johnson.

U.S. officials have offered mild criti-
cisms of a few Israeli actions but have done
little to help create a viable Palestinian state.
Former national security adviser Brent
Scowcroft even declared in October 2004
that Sharon has President Bush "wrapped
around his little finger." If Bush tries to
distance the United States from Israel, or
even criticizes Israeli actions in the Occupied
Territories, he is certain to face the wrath of
the lobby and its supporters in Congress.
Democratic party presidential candidates
understand these facts of life too, which is
why John Kerry went to great lengths to
display his unalloyed support for Israel in
2004 and why John McCain and Hillary
Clinton are doing the same thing today.

Maintaining U.S. support for Israel's
policies against the Palestinians is a core
goal of the lobby, but its ambitions do not
stop there. It also wants America to help
Israel remain the dominant regional power.
Not surprisingly, the Israeli government and
pro-Israel groups in the United States
worked together to shape the policy of the
Bush administration towards Iraq, Syria
and Iran, as well as its grand scheme for
reordering the Middle East.

**Israel and the Iraq War**

Pressure from Israel and the lobby
was not the only factor behind the U.S.
decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but
it was a critical element. Some Americans
believe that this was a "war for oil," but
there is hardly any direct evidence to support this claim. Instead, the war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. According to Philip Zelikow, a member of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (2001-03), executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and now counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the "real threat" from Iraq was not a threat to the United States. 153 The "unstated threat" was the "threat against Israel," Zelikow told a University of Virginia audience in September 2002, noting further that "the American government doesn't want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell." 154

On August 16, 2002, eleven days before Vice President Cheney kicked off the campaign for war with a hard-line speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, The Washington Post reported that "Israel is urging U.S. officials not to delay a military strike against Iraq's Saddam Hussein." 155 By this point, according to Sharon, strategic coordination between Israel and the United States had reached "unprecedented dimensions," and Israeli intelligence officials had given Washington a variety of alarming reports about Iraq's WMD programs. 156 As one retired Israeli general later put it, "Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regarding Iraq's non-conventional capabilities." 157

Israeli leaders were deeply distressed when President Bush decided to seek U.N. Security Council authorization for war in September, and even more worried when Saddam agreed to let U.N. inspectors back into Iraq, because these developments seemed to reduce the likelihood of war. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told report-
ers in September 2002, "The campaign against Saddam Hussein is a must. Inspections and inspectors are good for decent people, but dishonest people can overcome easily inspections and inspectors." 158

At the same time, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak wrote a New York Times op-ed warning that "the greatest risk now lies in inaction." 159 His predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu, published a similar piece in The Wall Street Journal entitled "The Case for Toppling Saddam." 160 Netanyahu declared, "Today nothing less than dismantling his regime will do," adding, "I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre-emptive strike against Saddam's regime." Or, as Ha'aretz reported in February 2003, "The [Israeli] military and political leadership yearns for war in Iraq." 161

As Netanyahu suggests, however, the desire for war was not confined to Israel's leaders. Apart from Kuwait, which Saddam conquered in 1990, Israel was the only country in the world in which both the politicians and the public enthusiastically favored war. 162 As journalist Gideon Levy observed at the time, "Israel is the only country in the West whose leaders support the war unreservedly and where no alternative opinion is voiced." 163 In fact, Israelis were so gung-ho for war that their allies in America told them to damp down their hawkish rhetoric, lest it look as if the war was for Israel. 164

The Lobby and the Iraq War

Within the United States, the main driving force behind the Iraq War was a small band of neoconservatives, many with close ties to Israel's Likud party. 165 In addition, key leaders of the lobby's major
organizations lent their voices to the campaign for war. According to Forward,

> As President Bush attempted to sell the . . . war in Iraq, America's most important Jewish organizations rallied as one to his defense. In statement after statement community leaders stressed the need to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.

The editorial goes on to say that "concern for Israel's safety rightfully factored into the deliberations of the main Jewish groups."

Although neoconservatives and other lobby leaders were eager to invade Iraq, the broader American Jewish community was not. In fact, Samuel Freedman reported just after the war started that "a compilation of nationwide opinion polls by the Pew Research Center shows that Jews are less supportive of the Iraq war than the population at large, 52% to 62%." Thus, it would be wrong to blame the war in Iraq on "Jewish influence." Rather, the war was due in large part to the lobby's influence, and especially that of the neoconservatives within it.

The neoconservatives were already determined to topple Saddam before Bush became president. They caused a stir in early 1998 by publishing two open letters to President Clinton calling for Saddam's removal from power. The signatories, many of whom had close ties to pro-Israel groups like JINSA or WINEP and whose ranks included Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, William Kristol, Bernard Lewis, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, had little trouble convincing the Clinton administration to adopt the general goal of ousting Saddam. But the neoconservatives were unable to sell a war to achieve that objective. Nor were they able to generate much enthusiasm for invading Iraq in the early months of the Bush administration. As important as the neoconservatives were for making the Iraq war happen, they needed help to achieve their aim.

That help arrived with 9/11. Specifically, the events of that fateful day led Bush and Cheney to reverse course and become strong proponents of a preventive war to topple Saddam. Neoconservatives in the lobby — most notably Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz and Princeton historian Bernard Lewis — reportedly played especially critical roles in persuading the president and vice president to favor war.

For the neoconservatives, 9/11 was a golden opportunity to make the case for war with Iraq. At a key meeting with Bush at Camp David on September 15, Wolfowitz advocated attacking Iraq before Afghanistan, even though there was no evidence that Saddam was involved in the attacks on the United States and Bin Laden was known to be in Afghanistan. Bush rejected this advice and chose to go after Afghanistan instead, but war with Iraq was now regarded as a serious possibility. The president tasked U.S. military planners on November 21, 2001, with developing concrete plans for an invasion.

Meanwhile, other neoconservatives were at work within the corridors of power. We do not have the full story yet, but scholars like Lewis and Fouad Ajami of John Hopkins University reportedly played key roles in convincing Vice President Cheney to favor the war. Cheney's views were also heavily influenced by the neoconservatives on his staff, especially
Eric Edelman, John Hannah and chief of staff Libby, one of the most powerful individuals in the administration. The vice president's influence helped convince President Bush by early 2002. With Bush and Cheney on board, the die was cast for war.

Outside the administration, neoconservative pundits lost no time making the case that invading Iraq was essential to winning the war on terrorism. Their efforts were partly aimed at keeping pressure on Bush and partly intended to overcome opposition to the war both inside and outside of the government. On September 20, a group of prominent neoconservatives and their allies published another open letter, telling the president, "Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the [9/11] attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The letter also reminded Bush that "Israel has been and remains America's staunchest ally against international terrorism." In the October 1 issue of The Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and William Kristol called for regime change in Iraq immediately after the Taliban was defeated. That same day, Charles Krauthammer argued in The Washington Post that after we were finished with Afghanistan, Syria should be next, followed by Iran and Iraq. "The war on terrorism," he argued, "will conclude in Baghdad," when we finish off "the most dangerous terrorist regime in the world." These salvos were the beginning of an unrelenting public-relations campaign to win support for invading Iraq. A key part of this campaign was the manipulation of intelligence information so as to make Saddam look like an imminent threat. For example, Libby visited the CIA several times to pressure analysts to find evidence that would make the case for war. He also helped prepare a detailed briefing on the Iraq threat in early 2003 that was pushed on Colin Powell, then preparing his infamous presentation to the UN Security Council on that subject. According to Bob Woodward, Powell "was appalled at what he considered overreaching and hyperbole. Libby was drawing only the worst conclusions from fragments and silky threads." Although Powell discarded Libby's most outrageous claims, his U.N. presentation was still riddled with errors, as Powell now acknowledges.

The campaign to manipulate intelligence also involved two organizations that were created after 9/11 and reported directly to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was tasked with finding links between al-Qaeda and Iraq that the intelligence community supposedly missed. Its two key members were David Wurmser, a hard-core neoconservative, and Michael Maloof, a Lebanese-American who had close ties with Perle. The Office of Special Plans was tasked with finding evidence that could be used to sell war with Iraq. It was headed by Abram Shulsky, a neoconservative

Yet there is still a ray of hope. Although the lobby remains a powerful force, the adverse effects of its influence are increasingly difficult to hide.
with longstanding ties to Wolfowitz, and its ranks included recruits from pro-Israel think tanks. Like virtually all the neoconservatives, Feith is deeply committed to Israel. He also has longstanding ties to the Likud party. He wrote articles in the 1990s supporting the settlements and arguing that Israel should retain the Occupied Territories. More important, along with Perle and Wurmser, he wrote the famous "Clean Break" report in June 1996 for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Among other things, it recommended that Netanyahu "focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right." It also called for Israel to take steps to reorder the entire Middle East. Netanyahu did not implement their advice, but Feith, Perle and Wurmser were soon advocating that the Bush administration pursue those same goals. This situation prompted Ha'aretz columnist Akiva Eldar to warn that Feith and Perle "are walking a fine line between their loyalty to American governments … and Israeli interests." 

Wolfowitz is equally committed to Israel. Forward once described him as "the most hawkishly pro-Israel voice in the administration," and selected him in 2002 as the first among 50 notables who "have consciously pursued Jewish activism." At about the same time, JINSA gave Wolfowitz its Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award for promoting a strong partnership between Israel and the United States. The Jerusalem Post, describing him as "devoutly pro-Israel," named him "Man of the Year" in 2003. Finally, a brief word is in order about the neoconservatives' prewar support of Ahmed Chalabi, the unscrupulous Iraqi exile who headed the Iraqi National Congress (INC). They embraced Chalabi because he had worked to establish close ties with Jewish-American groups and had pledged to foster good relations with Israel once he gained power. This was precisely what pro-Israel proponents of regime change wanted to hear, so they backed Chalabi in return. Journalist Matthew Berger laid out the essence of the bargain in the Jewish Journal:

The INC saw improved relations as a way to tap Jewish influence in Washington and Jerusalem and to drum up increased support for its cause. For their part, the Jewish groups saw an opportunity to pave the way for better relations between Israel and Iraq, if and when the INC is involved in replacing Saddam Hussein's regime.

Given the neoconservatives' devotion to Israel, their obsession with Iraq and their influence in the Bush administration, it is not surprising that many Americans suspected that the war was designed to further Israeli interests. For example, Barry Jacobs of the American Jewish Committee acknowledged in March 2005 that the belief that Israel and the neoconservatives conspired to get the United States into a war in Iraq was "pervasive" in the U.S. intelligence community. Yet few people would say so publicly, and most who did — including Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) and Representative James Moran (D-VA) — were condemned for raising the issue. Journalist Michael Kinsley put the point well in late 2002, when he wrote, "The lack of public discussion about the role of Israel
...is the proverbial elephant in the room: Everybody sees it, no one mentions it." 194 The reason for this reluctance, he observed, was fear of being labeled an antisemite.

To be sure, the groups and individuals that pushed for war did not operate in a vacuum, and they did not lead the United States to war by themselves. As noted, the war would probably not have occurred absent the September 11 attacks, which helped convince President Bush and Vice President Cheney to support it. Still, neoconservatives like Wolfowitz, then-deputy defense secretary, were quick to link Saddam Hussein with 9/11 (even though there was no evidence he was involved), and portray his overthrow as critical to winning the war on terror. Thus, the lobby's actions were a necessary but not sufficient condition for war. Without its efforts, the United States would have been far less likely to have gone to war in March 2003.

Dreams of Regional Transformation

The Iraq War was not supposed to be a costly debacle. Rather, it was intended as the first step in a larger plan to reorder the Middle East. This ambitious strategy was a dramatic departure from previous U.S. policy, and the lobby and Israel were critical driving forces behind this shift. This point was made clearly after the Iraq War began in a front-page story in The Wall Street Journal. The headline says it all: "President's Dream: Changing Not Just Regime but a Region: A Pro-U.S., Democratic Area Is a Goal That Has Israeli and Neoconservative Roots." 195

Pro-Israel forces have long been interested in getting the U.S. military more directly involved in the Middle East, so that it could help protect Israel. 196 But they had limited success on this front during the Cold War, because America acted as an "off-shore balancer" in the region. Most U.S. forces designated for the Middle East, like the Rapid Deployment Force, were kept "over the horizon" and out of harm's way. Washington maintained a favorable balance of power by playing local powers off against each other. This is the reason the Reagan administration supported Saddam against revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88).

Policy changed after the first Gulf War, when the Clinton administration adopted a strategy of "dual containment." It called for stationing substantial U.S. forces in the region to contain both Iran and Iraq, instead of using one to check the other. The father of dual containment was Martin Indyk, who first articulated the strategy in May 1993 at the pro-Israel think tank WINEP and then implemented it as director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council. 197

There was considerable dissatisfaction with dual containment by the mid-1990s. It made the United States the mortal enemy of two regimes that also hated each other, and it forced Washington to bear the burden of containing both of them. 198 Not surprisingly, the lobby worked actively in Congress to save the policy. 199 Pressed by AIPAC and other pro-Israel forces, Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC and company wanted more. The result was the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed sanctions on any foreign companies investing more than $40 million to develop petroleum resources in Iran or Libya. As Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent for
Haaretz, noted at the time, “Israel is but a tiny element in the big scheme, but one should not conclude that it cannot influence those within the Beltway.”

By the late 1990s, however, the neoconservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in Iraq was now essential. By toppling Saddam and turning Iraq into a vibrant democracy, they argued, the United States would trigger a far-reaching process of change throughout the Middle East. This line of thinking, of course, was evident in the “Clean Break” study the neoconservatives wrote for Netanyahu. By 2002, when invading Iraq had become a front-burner issue, regional transformation had become an article of faith in neoconservative circles.

Charles Krauthammer describes this grand scheme as the brainchild of Natan Sharansky, the Israeli politician whose writings have impressed President Bush. But Sharansky was hardly a lone voice in Israel. In fact, Israelis across the political spectrum believed that toppling Saddam would alter the Middle East to Israel’s advantage. Aluf Benn reported in Haaretz (February 17, 2003), “Senior IDF officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Adviser Ephraim Halevy, paint a rosy picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envision a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel’s other enemies…. Along with these leaders will disappear terror and weapons of mass destruction.”

In short, Israeli leaders, neoconservatives and the Bush administration all saw war with Iraq as the first step in an ambitious campaign to remake the Middle East. And in the first flush of victory, they turned their sights on Israel’s other regional opponents.

Gunning for Syria

Israeli leaders did not push the Bush administration to put the screws on Syria before March 2003; they were too busy pushing for war against Iraq. But once Baghdad fell in mid-April, Sharon and his lieutenants began urging Washington to target Damascus. On April 16, for example, Sharon and Shaul Mofaz, his defense minister, gave high-profile interviews in different Israeli newspapers. Sharon, in Yedioth Ahronoth, called for the United States to put “very heavy” pressure on Syria. Mofaz told Ma’ariv, “We have a long list of issues that we are thinking of demanding of the Syrians, and it is appropriate that it should be done through the Americans.” Sharon’s national security adviser, Ephraim Halevy, told a WINEP audience that it was now important for the United States to get rough with Syria. The Washington Post reported that Israel was “fueling the campaign” against Syria by feeding the United States intelligence reports about the actions of President Bashar al-Asad.

Prominent members of the lobby made the same arguments after Baghdad fell. Wolfowitz declared, “There has got to be regime change in Syria.” Richard Perle told a journalist, “We could deliver a short message, a two-word message [to other hostile regimes in the Middle East]: ‘You’re next.’” In early April, WINEP released a bipartisan report stating that Syria “should not miss the message that countries that pursue Saddam’s reckless, irresponsible and defiant behavior could end up sharing his fate.” On April 15, Yossi Klein
Halevi wrote a piece in *The Los Angeles Times* entitled "Next, Turn the Screws on Syria." The following day, Zev Chafets wrote an article for the *New York Daily News* entitled "Terror-Friendly Syria Needs a Change, Too." Not to be outdone, Lawrence Kaplan wrote in *The New Republic* on April 21 that Syrian leader Asad was a serious threat to America.211

Back on Capitol Hill, Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) had reintroduced the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act on April 12.212 It threatened sanctions against Syria if it did not withdraw from Lebanon, give up its WMD and stop supporting terrorism. It also called for Syria and Lebanon to take concrete steps to make peace with Israel. This legislation was strongly endorsed by the lobby — especially AIPAC — and "framed," according to the *Jewish Telegraph Agency*, "by some of Israel's best friends in Congress."213 It had been on the back burner for some time, largely because the Bush administration had little enthusiasm for it. But the anti-Syrian act passed overwhelmingly (398-4 in the House; 89-4 in the Senate), and Bush signed it into law on December 12, 2003.214

Yet the Bush administration was still divided about the wisdom of targeting Syria at that time. Although the neoconservatives were eager to pick a fight with Damascus, the CIA and the State Department were opposed. Even after Bush signed the new law, he emphasized that he would go slowly in implementing it.215

Bush's ambivalence is understandable. First, the Syrian government had been providing the United States with important intelligence about al-Qaeda since 9/11 and had also warned Washington about a planned terrorist attack in the Gulf.216 Syria had also given CIA interrogators access to Mohammed Zammar, the alleged recruiter of some of the 9/11 hijackers. Targeting the Asad regime would jeopardize these valuable connections and thus undermine the larger war on terrorism.

Second, Syria was not on bad terms with Washington before the Iraq War (it had even voted for U.N. Resolution 1441), and it was no threat to the United States. Playing hardball with Syria would make the United States look like a bully with an insatiable appetite for beating up Arab states. Finally, putting Syria on the American hit list would give Damascus a powerful incentive to cause trouble in Iraq. Even if one wanted to pressure Syria, it made good sense to finish the job in Iraq first.

Yet Congress insisted on putting the screws to Damascus, largely in response to pressure from Israeli officials and pro-Israel groups like AIPAC.217 If there were no lobby, there would have been no Syria Accountability Act, and U.S. policy toward Damascus would have been more in line with the U.S. national interest.

### Putting Iran in the Crosshairs

Although Israeli officials tend to describe every threat in the starkest terms, Iran is widely portrayed as their most dangerous enemy because it is the most likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Most Israelis regard an Islamic country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons as an existential threat. As Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer remarked one year before the Iraq War: "Iraq is a problem .... But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq." 218

Sharon began publicly pushing the United States to confront Iran in Novem-
ber 2002 in a high-profile interview in *The Times* (London). Describing Iran as the "center of world terror" and bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, he declared that the Bush administration should put the strong arm on Iran "the day after" it conquered Iraq. In late April 2003, *Ha'aretz* reported that the Israeli ambassador in Washington was now calling for regime change in Iran. The overthrow of Saddam, he noted, was "not enough." In his words, America "has to follow through. We still have great threats of that magnitude coming from Syria, coming from Iran."

The neoconservatives also lost no time in making the case for regime change in Tehran. On May 6, AEI cosponsored an all-day conference on Iran with the pro-Israel Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute. The speakers were all strongly pro-Israel, and many called for the United States to replace the Iranian regime with a democracy. As usual, there followed a stream of articles by prominent neoconservatives making the case for going after Iran. For example, William Kristol wrote in *The Weekly Standard* on May 12, "The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East .... But the next great battle — not, we hope, a military one — will be for Iran."

The Bush administration has responded to the lobby's pressure by working overtime to shut down Iran's nuclear program. Iran seems determined to obtain a nuclear capability, however, and Washington has had little success in its attempts to thwart it. As a result, the lobby has intensified its pressure on the U.S. government, using all the strategies in its playbook. Op-eds and articles now warn of imminent dangers from a nuclear Iran, caution against any appeasement of a "terrorist" regime, and hint darkly of preventive action should diplomacy fail. The lobby is also pushing Congress to approve the Iran Freedom Support Act, which would expand existing sanctions on Iran. Israeli officials also warn that they may take preemptive action should Iran continue down the nuclear road, hints partly intended to keep Washington focused on this issue.

One might argue that Israel and the lobby have not had much influence on U.S. policy toward Iran, since the United States has its own reasons to keep Iran from going nuclear. This is partly true, but Iran's nuclear ambitions do not pose an existential threat to the United States. If Washington could live with a nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear China or even a nuclear North Korea — regimes that were at one time regarded as fanatical and possibly undeterred — then it can live with a nuclear Iran. This is the reason the lobby must keep constant pressure on U.S. politicians to confront Tehran. Iran and the United States would hardly be allies if the lobby did not exist, but U.S. policy would be more temperate, Iran's past overtures might well have been welcomed and pursued and preventive war would not be a serious option.

**Summary**

It is not surprising that Israel and its American supporters want the United States to deal with any and all threats to Israel's security. If their efforts to shape U.S. policy succeed, Israel's enemies get weakened or overthrown and Israel gets a free hand with the Palestinians. But, even if the United States fails to transform the Middle East and finds itself in conflict with an increasingly radicalized Arab and Islamic world, Israel still ends up protected
by the world's only superpower.225 This is not a perfect outcome from the lobby's perspective, but it is obviously preferable to Washington's distancing itself from Israel or using its leverage to force Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.

CONCLUSION

Can the lobby's power be curtailed? One would like to think so, given the Iraq debacle, the obvious need to rebuild America's image in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and the recent revelations about AIPAC officials passing U.S. government secrets to Israel. One might also think that Arafat's death and the election of the more moderate Mahmoud Abbas would have led Washington to press vigorously and even-handedly for a peace agreement. In short, there are ample grounds for U.S. leaders to distance themselves from the lobby and adopt a Middle East policy more consistent with broader U.S. interests. In particular, using American power to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help advance the broader goals of fighting extremism and promoting democracy in the Middle East.

But that is not going to happen anytime soon. AIPAC and its allies (including Christian Zionists) have no serious opponents in the struggle for influence in Washington. Although a few countervailing forces do exist, they are either significantly weaker (in the case of pro-Arab or pro-Islamic groups) or not interested in broad foreign-policy questions (in the case of oil companies and weapons manufacturers).226 Organizations in the lobby know it has become more difficult to make Israel's case today, and they are responding by expanding their activities and staffs.227 Moreover, American politicians remain acutely sensitive to campaign contributions and other forms of political pressure, and major media outlets are likely to remain sympathetic to Israel no matter what it does.

This situation is dangerous for the United States because the lobby's influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face, including America's various allies. By preventing U.S. leaders from pressuring Israel to make peace, the lobby has also made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This situation gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorists and sympathizers, and contributes to Islamic radicalism around the world.

Furthermore, the lobby's campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the United States to attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We do not need another Iraq. At a minimum, the lobby's hostility toward these countries makes it especially difficult for Washington to enlist them against al-Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency, where their help is badly needed.

There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the lobby, the United States has become the de facto enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This situation undermines Washington's efforts to promote democracy abroad and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect human rights. U.S. efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally hypocritical, given its willingness to accept Israel's nuclear arsenal, which encourages Iran and others to seek similar capabilities.

Moreover, the lobby's campaign to squelch debate about Israel is unhealthy for
Although the existence of individuals and groups lobbying on Israel's behalf does not prove that unconditional U.S. support for Israel is contrary to the national interest, it does suggest that this support would not be provided if the lobby were less powerful. If unconditional support were obviously the right policy, it probably would not take constant efforts by a powerful special-interest group to bring it about. As Richard Gephardt, the former House Minority Leader, told the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), "Without [your] constant support . . . and all your fighting on a daily basis to strengthen that relationship, it would not be." Moreover, if the lobby were weaker, U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran, Iraq and Syria would almost certainly be different. The Gephardt quotation was downloaded from the AIPAC website [http://www.aipac.org/] on January 12, 2004. Also see Michael Kinsley, "J’Accuse, Sort Of," Slate.com, March 12, 2003.


3 According to the "Greenbook," Israel received about $3.7 billion in direct aid from the United States in 2003. Israel's population according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS] and the CIA is

U.S. Assistance to Israel

Alliance

Season on UN Workers," War, that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close. The change was clearly manifested support the Arabs." Moshe Dayan, country that was ready to stand by us, my silent reflection was that the United States would really rather time of the October 1973 War, noted, "Though I happened to remark that the United States was the only


Nathan Guttman, "U.S. Accused of Pro-Israel Bias at 2000 Camp David," Ha'aretz, April 29, 2005. Also see Aaron D. Miller, "Israel's Lawyer," The Washington Post, May 23, 2005; "Lessons of Arab-Israeli Negotiating: Four Negotiators Look Back and Ahead," Transcript of panel discussion, Middle East Institute, April 25, 2005. For general discussions of how the United States consistently favors Israel over the Palestinians, see Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (South End Press, 1999); Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (University of California Press, 2001); Naseer H. Aruri, Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine (South End Press, 2003). It is also worth noting that the British favored the Zionists over the Palestinians during the period of the British Mandate (1919-48). See Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (Henry Holt, 2000).


This point was not lost on Moshe Dayan, who, remembering a talk he had with Henry Kissinger at the time of the October 1973 War, noted, "Though I happened to remark that the United States was the only country that was ready to stand by us, my silent reflection was that the United States would really rather support the Arabs." Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (William Morrow, 1976), pp. 512-513. Also see Zach Levey, "The United States' Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal," Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 255-276.

Bernard Lewis wrote in 1992, "Whatever value Israel might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War, that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close. The change was clearly manifested
in the Gulf War last year, when what the United States most desired from Israel was to keep out of the conflict — to be silent, inactive and, as far as possible, invisible. Israel was not an asset, but an irrelevance — some even said a nuisance. Some of the things that the Israeli government later said and did were unlikely to change this perception. "Rethinking the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 110-111.

15 According to Middle East expert Shibley Telhami, "No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab world, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than Palestine. No other issue shapes the regional perceptions of America more fundamentally than the issue of Palestine." The Stakes: America and the Middle East (Westview Press, 2002), p. 96. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former UN special envoy to Iraq, whom the Bush administration enlisted to help form an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, said that Israeli policy toward the Palestinians is "the great poison in the region," and that "in the region, and beyond" people recognized the "injustice of this policy and the equally unjust support of the United States for this policy." See Warren Hoge, "U.N. Moves to Disassociate Itself from Remarks by Envoy to Iraq," The New York Times, April 23, 2004; "Brahimi's Israel Comments Draw Annan, Israel Ire," Ha'aretz, April 24, 2004. Also see the comments of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak in "Mubarak: Arab Hatred of America Growing," The Washington Post, April 20, 2004. Finally, see Ami Eden, "9/11 Commission Finds Anger at Israel Fueling Islamic Terrorism Wave," Forward, July 30, 2004.

16 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks against the United States, "Outline of the 9/11 Plot," Staff Statement No. 16, June 16, 2004. Also see Nathan Gutman, "Al-Qaida Planned Attacks during PM's Visit to White House," Ha'aretz, June 17, 2004; Marc Perelman, "Bin Laden Aimed to Link Plot to Israel," Forward, June 25, 2004. Pro-Israel supporters often argue that Bin Laden only became interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 9/11, and only because he thought that it was good for recruiting purposes. In this view, there is virtually no connection between what happened on 9/11 and U.S. support for Israel. See Andrea Levin, "Don't Scapegoat Israel," The Boston Globe, October 6, 2001; Norman Podhoretz, "Israel Isn't the Issue," The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2001. Note that both of these pieces were published right after the Twin Towers fell. However, we now have a substantial number of Bin Laden's writings and talks from the 1980s and 1990s, and it is clear that he cared deeply about matters relating to Jerusalem and the Palestinians long before 9/11. See, for example, "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998; Transcript of Osama bin Laden's Letter to the Taliban, June 20, 1997, interview with Peter Arnett of CNN (first broadcast May 10, 1997). Also "New Osama bin Laden Video Contains Anti-Israel and Anti-American Statements," downloaded from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) website [http://www.adl.org/terrorism_americab/bin_l_print.asp] on March 8, 2004.


18 "President Discusses War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom," speech delivered at Renaissance Cleveland Hotel, March 20, 2006, Office of the White House Press Secretary.


Washington Post, April 21, 2004. Even some Israelis understand that "the continuation of this conflict, including the Israeli occupation, will most certainly lead to new waves of terror; international terrorism, which the Americans fear so much, will spread." Ze'ev Schiff, "Fitting into America's Strategy," Ha'aretz, August 1, 2003. It is also worth noting that some 50 retired American diplomats wrote a letter in May 2004 to President Bush similar to the letter that the British diplomats sent to Tony Blair. A copy of the American letter was published in The New York Review of Books, November 18, 2004.


On the Pollard affair, see Hersh, Samson Option, pp. 285-305; Idem, "The Traitor: Why Pollard Should Never Be Released," The New Yorker, Vol. 74, issue 42 (January 18, 1999), pp. 26-33. There are a huge number of articles on the internet dealing with the Franklin Affair. For a good overview of the case, see Jeffrey
Avoiding the Commission Recommendations,” For evidence of how hostile many Israelis were to the report’s findings and recommendations, see “No Jew,” from 1882 to 1903. There were slightly more than 15,000 Jews in Palestine in 1882. Justin McCarthy, buildings and bridges there.

30 Israel formally withdrew from Gaza in the summer of 2005, but continued to maintain substantial control over its residents. Specifically, Israel controls air, sea and land access, which means that the Palestinians are in effect prisoners within Gaza, able to enter or leave only with Israeli approval. Escalating violence in the summer of 2006 led Israel to reoccupy Gaza, and Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire have destroyed key buildings and bridges there.

31 The first wave of European Jews to come to Palestine is known as the First Aliyah, and it covers the years from 1882 to 1903. There were slightly more than 15,000 Jews in Palestine in 1882. Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate (Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 10, which has excellent data for the years from 1850 to 1915. McCarthy’s numbers are based on Ottoman census figures, which exclude “an unknown number of Jewish immigrants who had kept their original citizenship.” He notes further that “there would have been relatively few non-citizen Jews at that early date,” and estimates the number as “perhaps one to two thousand” (p. 13). Also see Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 124.
The total population of Palestine in 1893 was roughly 530,000, of whom about 19,000 were Jewish (3.6 percent). Arabs comprised the vast majority of the remaining population. McCarthy, *Population of Palestine*, p. 10.


Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956* (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 11. According to Shabtai Teveth, "[M]ass immigration and military strength would serve still another purpose, at which Ben-Gurion only hinted. Only initiates knew that Ben-Gurion regarded the creation of a Jewish state in part of Palestine as a stage in the longer process toward a Jewish state in all of Palestine. . . . And so Ben-Gurion spoke in ambiguous tones about a state being but a step toward 'a complete solution for the Jewish people and a powerful instrument for the total fulfillment of Zionism, an instrument for the redemption of all the Land of Israel'. . . . In October 1938, he wrote to his children that 'I don't regard a state in part of Palestine as the final aim of Zionism, but as a means toward that aim'.” See Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War* (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 187-188. Ben-Gurion retained this view after independence, saying in early 1949 that "Before the founding of the state, on the eve of its creation, our main interest was self-defense. . . . but now the issue at hand is conquest, not self defense. As for setting the borders — it's an open-ended matter. In the Bible as well as in our history there are all kinds of definitions of the country's borders, so there's no real limit." Quoted in Tom Segev, *1949: The First Israelis* (Henry Holt & Co., 1998) p. 6.

Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, p. 128. Also see Morris, *Righteous Victims*, pp. 140, 142, 168-169. This statement is from a memorandum Ben-Gurion wrote prior to the Extraordinary Zionist Conference at New York's Biltmore Hotel in May 1942. After outlining the need for "brutal compulsion," Ben-Gurion also noted that "we should in no way make it part of our programme." Ben-Gurion was not rejecting this policy, however, he was simply noting that the Zionists should not openly proclaim it. Indeed, he went on to say that the Zionists should not "discourage other people, British or American, who favour transfer from advocating this course, but we should in no way make it part of our programme." Ben-Gurion would have preferred to consolidate Jewish control over Palestine in agreement with the Arabs, but he recognized that this was unlikely and that the Zionists would have to acquire a strong military force in order to achieve their aims. As he wrote Moshe Sharet in June 1937, "Were I an Arab. . .an Arab politically, nationally minded…I would rebel even more vigorously, bitterly, and desperately against the immigration that will one day turn Palestine and all its Arab residents over to Jewish rule." Quoted in Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, 1886-1948* (Houghton Mifflin, 1987), p. 544. When combined with his other statements on this topic, it is clear that Ben-Gurion understood that a predominantly Jewish state was unlikely to be established without forcefully removing the Arab population.


Morris, *Birth Revisited*, provides a detailed account of this event. Also see Meron Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*, trans. Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta (University of California Press, 2000), chapters 3-4. The only remaining debate of real significance regarding the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland is whether it was "born of war," as Morris argues, or by design, as Norman Finkelstein argues in *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict* (London: Verso, 1995), chapter 3.

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41 Nahum Goldmann, The Jewish Paradox, trans. Steve Cox (Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 99. Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founding father of the Israeli right, made essentially the same point when he wrote, "Colonization is self-explanatory and what it implies is fully understood by every sensible Jew and Arab. There can only be one purpose in colonization. For the country's Arabs that purpose is essentially unacceptable. This is a natural reaction and nothing will change it." Quoted in Ian Lustick, "To Build and To Be Built By: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall," Israel Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 200.


43 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 147. Meir also said, "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist." Masalha, Imperial Israel, p. 47. Rabin said in 1995, two years after signing the Oslo accords, "I seek peaceful coexistence between Israel as a Jewish state, not all over the land of Israel, or most of it; its capital, the united Jerusalem; its security border with Jordan rebuilt; next to it, a Palestinian entity, less than a state, that runs the life of Palestinians …. This is my goal, not to return to the pre-Six-Day War lines but to create two entities, a separation between Israel and the Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." Hanieh and Cook, "Road Map." Also see Akiva Eldar, "On the Same Page, Ten Years On," Ha'aretz, November 5, 2005; David Grossman, "The Night Our Hope for Peace Died," The Guardian, November 4, 2005; Michael Jansen, "A Practice that Prevents the Emergence of a Palestinian State," Jordan Times, November 10, 2005. In the spring of 1998, Israel and its American supporters sharply criticized First Lady Hillary Clinton for saying, "It would be in the long-term interests of peace in the Middle East for there to be a state of Palestine, a functioning modern state that is on the same footing as other states." Tom Rhodes and Christopher Walker, "Congress Tells Israel to Reject Clinton's Pullout Plan," The New York Times, May 8, 1998; James Bennet, "Aides Disavow Mrs. Clinton on Mideast," The New York Times, May 8, 1998.

Palestinian I would have rejected Camp David, as well." See "Norman Finkelstein & Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami Debate: Complete Transcript," Democracy Now! Radio and TV broadcast, February 14, 2006.

43 In a speech in October 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," a statement widely interpreted as threatening the physical destruction of the Jewish state and its inhabitants. A more accurate translation of Ahmadinejad's statement is "the occupation regime over Jerusalem should vanish from the page of time" (or alternatively, "be eliminated from the pages of history"). Instead of calling for the physical destruction of Israel, Ahmadinejad was suggesting that Israel's control over Jerusalem should be seen as a temporary condition, like Soviet control of Eastern Europe or the shah's regime in Iran. While still provocative and highly objectionable, it was not a call for the physical liquidation of Israel or its population. See Ethan Bronner and Nazila Fathi, "Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words Against Israel?" The New York Times, June 11, 2006; Jonathan Steele, "Lost in Translation," The Guardian, June 14, 2006; "Iranian President at Tehran Conference: 'Very Soon, This Stain of Disgrace [i.e. Israel] Will Be Purged From the Center of the Islamic World — and This is Attainable'," Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 1013, October 25, 2005.


45 Morris, Righteous Victims, chapters 2-5.

46 Morris, Birth Revisited. It should be noted that many Israeli documents concerning the events of 1948 remain classified; Morris expects "that with respect to both expulsions and atrocities, we can expect additional revelations as the years pass and more Israeli records become available." Morris, "Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus," in Rogan and Shlaim, War for Palestine, p. 49. In fact, he maintains that the reported cases of rape he knows about are "just the tip of the iceberg." See Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest."


48 During his negotiations with the British and French governments over the launching of the 1956 war, Ben-Gurion proposed a grand plan for reordering the region that would have divided Jordan between Israel and Iraq, transferred all of Lebanon south of the Litani River to Israel, and given Israel portions of the Sinai as well. On Israel's policies in the 1950s, see Morris, Israel's Border Wars; Morris, Righteous Victims, chapter 6, especially pp. 289-290; Shlaim, Iron Wall, chapters 3-4, especially pp. 184-185; Kennett Love, Suez: the Twice Fought War (McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 589-638; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 282-283.


50 Avnery, "Crying Wolf"; Robert Blecher, "Living on the Edge: The Threat of 'Transfer' in Israel and Palestine," MERIP, Middle East Report 225, Winter 2002; Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War against the Palestinians (Verso, 2003), p. 28. Also see Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, p. 97; Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 328-329; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (Seven Stories Press, 2002), p. 8. Morris reports (p. 329) that 120,000 Palestinians applied to return to their homes right after the 1967 War, but Israel allowed only about 17,000 to come back. Amnesty International estimated in mid-2003 that in the years since Israel had acquired the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it had destroyed more than 10,000 Palestinian homes in those areas. Danny Rubinstein, "Roads, Fences and Outposts Maintain Control in the Territories," Ha'aretz, August 12, 2003.
and 309 belonged to Israeli security forces. Israelis were killed by the Palestinians, 118 of whom were children. Of those 992 deaths, 683 were civilians while fighting the Israelis, and the circumstances of 563 deaths are unknown. During the same period, 992 by the Israelis, of whom 676 were children. Of those 3,386 deaths, 1,185 were bystanders, 1,008 were killed "Israeli Soldiers Tell of Indiscriminate Killings by Army and A Culture of Impunity," Reuven Pedatzur, "The Message to the Soldiers Was Clear," Greg Myre, "Former Israeli Soldiers Tell of Harassment of Palestinians," Shocked by Image of Soldiers Forcing Violinist to Play at Roadblock,

"Officer Tells Court Villagers Were Bound, Gagged and Beaten. 'Not Guilty' Plea at 'Break Bones' Trial," Jerusalem Post, March 30, 1990; Joshua Brillant, "Rabin Ordered Beatings, Meir Tells Military Court," Jerusalem Post, June 22, 1990; Jackson Diehl, "Rights Group Accuses Israel of Violence Against Children in Palestinian Uprising," The Washington Post, May 17, 1990; James A. Graff, "Crippling a People: Palestinian Children and Israeli State Violence," Alif, No. 13 (1993), pp. 46-63; Ronald R. Stockton, "Intifada Deaths," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1990), pp. 86-95. Ehud Barak, the IDF's Deputy Chief of Staff during the First Intifada, said at the time, "We do not want children to be shot under any circumstances …. When you see a child you don't shoot." Nevertheless, the Swedish Save the Children report estimated that 6,500 to 8,000 children were wounded by gunfire during the first two years of the Intifada. Researchers investigated 66 of the 106 recorded cases of "child gunshot deaths." They concluded that almost all of them "were hit by directed — not random or ricochet — gunfire"; nearly twenty percent suffered multiple gunshot wounds; twelve percent were shot from behind; fifteen percent of the children were ten years of age or younger; "most children were not participating in a stone-throwing demonstration when shot dead"; and "nearly one-fifth of the children were shot dead while at home or within ten meters of their homes."


See Swisher, Truth about Camp David, p. 387.

According to B'tselem, between September 29, 2000, and December 31, 2005, 3,386 Palestinians were killed by the Israelis, of whom 676 were children. Of those 3,386 deaths, 1,185 were bystanders, 1,008 were killed while fighting the Israelis, and the circumstances of 563 deaths are unknown. During the same period, 992 Israelis were killed by the Palestinians, 118 of whom were children. Of those 992 deaths, 683 were civilians and 309 belonged to Israeli security forces. B'tselem press release, January 4, 2006.

Nathan Gutman, "'It's a Terrible Thing, Living with the Knowledge that You Crushed Our Daughter,'" Ha'aretz, April 30, 2004; Adam Shapiro, "Remembering Rachel Corrie," The Nation, March 18, 2004; Tsahar Rotem, "British Peace Activist Shot by IDF Troops in Gaza Strip," Ha'aretz, April 11, 2003.

Molly Moore, "Ex-Security Chiefs Turn on Sharon," The Washington Post, November 15, 2003; "Ex-Shin Bet Heads Warn of 'Catastrophe' without Peace Deal," Ha'aretz, November 15, 2003. These comments were based on an interview in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth on November 14, 2003. For a copy of that interview, see "We Are Seriously Concerned about the Fate of the State of Israel," The Alternative Information Center, December 1, 2003.


See J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence (Transaction Publishers, 1996); Joseph Heller, The Sterngang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949 (Frank Cass, 1995); Bruce Hoffmann, The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939-1947 (Bar-Ilan University, 1983); Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 173-180; Segev, One Palestine, pp. 468-486. According to Haim Levenberg, 210 of the 429 casualties from Jewish terrorism in Palestine during 1946 were civilians. The other 219 were police and soldiers. Levenberg, Military Preparations, p. 72. Furthermore, it was Jewish terrorists from the infamous Irgun who in late 1937 introduced the practice of placing bombs in buses and large crowds. Benny Morris speculates that, "The Arabs may well have learned the value of terrorist bombings from the Jews." Righteous Victims, pp. 147, 201. Also see Lenny Bremer, The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (Zed Books, 1984), p. 100; Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: from Riots
to Rebellion, Vol. II, 1929-1939 (Frank Cass, 1977), p. 238. Finally, Morris notes that during the 1948 war the main Jewish terrorist groups "knowingly planted bombs in bus stops with the aim of killing non-combatants, including women and children." Birth Revisited, p. 80.

61 Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 336-340.


64 As with other special-interest groups, the boundaries of the Israel lobby cannot be defined precisely, which underscores the fact that it is not a hierarchical organization with a defined membership list. It has a core consisting of organizations whose declared purpose is to influence the U.S. government on Israel's behalf, but it also draws support from a penumbra of groups and individuals who are committed to steadfast U.S. support for Israel but who are not as energetically or consistently engaged as the core. Thus, an AIPAC lobbyist or an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is part of the core, but an individual who occasionally writes pro-Israel letters to his or her Congressional representative or local newspaper is part of the broader network of supporters.


73 On the role of interest groups in American politics, see David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (Alfred Knopf, 1951); James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Basic


See Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out*, chapter 3.

After Clinton appeared at a pro-Israel rally in July 2006 and expressed unqualified support for Israel's highly destructive retaliation in Lebanon, Helen Friedman, executive director of Americans for a Safe Israel, declared that "I thought her remarks were very good, especially in light of her history, and we can't forget her kiss to Suha." See Patrick Healy, "Clinton Vows to Back Israel in Latest Mideast Conflict," *The New York Times*, July 18, 2006.


although AIPAC has been able to use its political muscle to avoid having to register as a foreign agent for another government, it is especially concerned about that problem today because of the Larry Franklin spy scandal, and thus it is going to considerable lengths to emphasize its "American side." See Ori Nir, "Leaders Fear Probe Will Force Pro-Israel Lobby to File as 'Foreign Agent' Could Fuel Dual Loyalty Talk," *Forward*, December 31, 2004; Idem, "Leaders Stress American Side of AIPAC," *Forward*, May 27, 2005.


The Sharon quotation was printed in an AIPAC advertisement in *The Chicago Jewish Star*, August 29-September 11, 2000; the Olmert quotation is from "To Israel With Love," *The Economist*, August 5, 2006, p. 37. Sharon and Olmert are not alone in their appraisals of AIPAC's power. Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid says, "I can't think of a policy organization in the country as well-organized or respected [as AIPAC]," and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich called it "the most effective general-interest group . . . across the entire planet." Former President Bill Clinton described AIPAC as "stunningly effective" and "better than anyone else lobbying in this town." Quotations downloaded from the AIPAC website on January 14, 2005 [www.aipac.org/documents/whoweare.html#say].

Democratic National Finance Council, over 70 are Jewish; In 1976, over 60% of the large donors to the Democratic Party were Jewish; Over 60% of the monies raised by Nixon in 1972 was from Jewish contributors; Over 75% of the monies raised in Humphrey's 1968 campaign was from Jewish contributors; Over 90% of the monies raised by Scoop Jackson in the Democratic primaries was from Jewish contributors; In spite of the fact that you were a long shot and came from an area of the country where there is a smaller Jewish community, approximately 35% of our primary funds were from Jewish supporters. Wherever there is major political fundraising in this country, you will find American Jews playing a significant role." Hamilton Jordan, Confidential File, Box 34, File "Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77," declassified June 12, 1990.

87 Douglas Brinkley, "Out of the Loop," The New York Times, December 29, 2002. Lawrence Kaplan reports that after Bruce Riedel, the Middle East expert on the National Security Council, left his job at the end of 2001, the Pentagon "held up the appointment of Riedel's designated successor, Middle East expert Alina Romanowsky, whom Pentagon officials suspect of being insufficiently supportive of the Jewish state."

"Torpedo Boat: How Bush Turned on Arafat," The New Republic, February 18, 2003. The position was eventually filled by Elliot Abrams, a fervent supporter of Israel. "Indeed, for the government of Israel," Nathan Guttman wrote, "it is a gift from heaven." See "From Clemency to a Senior Post," Ha'aretz, December 16, 2002.


99 E.J. Kessler, "Dean Plans to Visit Israel, Political Baggage in Tow," Forward, July 8, 2005; Zunes, "Attacks on Dean."

91 Laura Blumenfeld, "Three Peace Suits; For These Passionate American Diplomats, a Middle East Settlement is the Goal of a Lifetime," The Washington Post, February 24, 1997.

92 Samuel ("Sandy") Berger, President Clinton's National Security Adviser, reports that at one point during the negotiations at Camp David (July 2000), Dennis Ross made the remarkable comment, "If Barak offers anything more, I'll be against this agreement." Unedited transcript of "Comments by Sandy Berger at the Launch of How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate (USIP Press, 2005)," U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, June 7, 2005.

93 Quoted in Blumenfeld, "Three Peace Suits."


97 Max Frankel, The Times of My Life And My Life with the Times (Random House, 1999), pp. 401-403.


101 Quoted in Milstein, "Washington Institute."


103 James D. Besser, "Turning up Heat in Campus Wars," Jewish Week, July 25, 2003; Ronald S. Lauder and

Besser, "Turning up Heat." In 2002 and 2003, AIPAC brought 240 college students to Washington, DC for intensive advocacy training, sending them back to school to win over campus leaders to Israel's cause. Besser, "Turning up Heat"; Pomerance, "Israel Forces Winning." In the spring of 2005, it hosted 100 student government presidents (80 of whom were not Jewish) at its annual conference. Nathaniel Popper, "Pro-Israel Groups: Campuses Improving," Forward, June 24, 2005.


Quoted in Cattan, "NYU Center."


The chairman of the Education Department of the Jewish Agency recently said that "present day violent anti-Semitism originates from two separate sources: radical Islamists in the Middle East and Western Europe as well as the neo-Nazi youth element in Eastern Europe and Latin America." Jonathan Schneider, "Anti-Semitism Still a World Problem," The Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2006.

In the ADL's April 2004 survey, "Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries," the following question was asked: "In your opinion, is it very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or not important at all for our government to take a role in combating anti-Semitism in our country?" The percentages for those who strongly agree or somewhat agree were Italy (92), Britain (83), Netherlands (83), France (82), Germany (81), Belgium (81), Denmark (79), Austria (76), Switzerland (74), Spain (73). See p. 19.


Helen Nugent, "Chief Rabbi Flays Church over Vote on Israel Assets," Times Online, February 17, 2006.
Also see Bill Bowder, "Sacks Seeks Talks after Synod Vote on Disinvestment," *Church Times*, February 24, 2002; "Bulldozer Motion 'Based on Ignorance'," in *ibid*; Ruth Gledhill, "Church Urged to Reconsider Investments with Israel," *Times Online*, May 28, 2005; Irene Lancaster, "Anglicans Have Betrayed the Jews," Downloaded from Moriel Ministries (UK) website, February 20, 2006; "U.K. Chief Rabbi Attacks Anglicans over Israel Divestment Vote," *Ha'aretz*, February 17, 2006.

127 That the Church of England was merely criticizing Israeli policy and not engaging in antisemitism is clearly reflected in the February 10, 2006, letter that the Archbishop of Canterbury (Rowan Williams) sent to England's Chief Rabbi (Jonathan Sacks) explaining the Church's decision on divestment. For a copy of the letter, see "Archbishop: Synod Call Was Expression of Concern," February 10, 2006. Downloaded from Church of England website, February 20, 2006.


140 It is worth noting that the American people were generally supportive of Bush's efforts to put pressure on Israel in the spring of 2002. A Time/CNN poll taken on April 10-11 found that 60 percent of Americans felt that U.S. aid to Israel should be cut off or reduced if Sharon refused to withdraw from the Palestinian areas he
had recently occupied. "Poll: Americans Support Cutting Aid to Israel," Reuters News Release, April 12, 2002; AFP News Release, April 13, 2002. Also see Israel and the Palestinians (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, last updated on August 15, 2002). Moreover, 75 percent of those surveyed thought that Powell should meet with Arafat when he visited Israel. Regarding Sharon, only 35 percent found him trustworthy, while 35 percent thought he was a warmonger, 20 percent saw him as a terrorist, and 25 percent considered him an enemy of the United States.

141 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Senior White House Aides: ‘Speak Up!’” The Weekly Standard, April 11, 2002. For a graphic description of the heat that the lobby put on Powell when he was in the Middle East, see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 323-326. Also see John Simpson, "Israeli Leader Has More Power in Washington than Powell," The Sunday Telegraph (London), April 14, 2002, which describes a joint press conference Powell and Sharon conducted by noting, "The Secretary of State's language, body and verbal, certainly were not that of the paymaster coming to call a client to account. Far from it. Mr. Powell seemed ingratiating, deferential; no doubt he realizes how much support Mr. Sharon has back in Washington and how much influence his friends have there with the President." It is also worth noting that former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was making Israel's case in the United States at the time, said even before Powell arrived in Israel that his trip "won't amount to anything." Elaine Sciolino, "Netanyahu Says Powell Mission 'Won't Amount to Anything' and Urges Arafat's Exile," The New York Times, April 11, 2002.


143 Randall Mikkelsen, "White House Calls Sharon 'Man of Peace'," Reuters, April 11, 2002; Bill Sammon, "White House Softens Tone with Israel," The Washington Times, April 12, 2002.


146 Arieh O'Sullivan, "Visiting Congressmen Advise Israel to Resist Administration Pressure to Deal with Arafat," The Jerusalem Post, May 6, 2002.


148 Quoted in Jefferson Morley, "Who's in Charge?" The Washington Post, April 26, 2002. As Akiva Eldar noted just before Sharon steamrolled Bush, "Sharon has a lot of experience sticking it to the Americans … Ultimately, whether it was Palestinian terror, Arafat's mistakes, or domestic politics, the Americans were sent to the peanut gallery." See his "Words Are Not Enough," Ha'aretz, April 8, 2002. Nor was Bush's humiliation lost on commentators around the world. Spain's leading daily, El Pais, expressed the views of many outside observers when it commented, "If a country's weight is measured by its degree of influence on events, the superpower is not the USA but Israel." Quoted in Morley, "Who's in Charge?"

149 Bradley Burston, "Hamas 'R' Us," Ha'aretz, January 18, 2006; Akiva Eldar, "Kadima to A New Middle

Regarding the views of previous Presidents, see Clyde R. Mark, "Israeli-United States Relations," Issue Brief for Congress (Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2002), p. 7. On April 14, 2004, Bush broke with his predecessors and proclaimed that Israel would not have to return all of the territories that it occupied in 1967, and that Palestinian refugees would not be allowed to return to their former homes in Israel, but would have to settle in a new Palestinian state. See "Statement by the President Regarding Israel-Arab Peace Process," April 14, 2004; and "President Bush's Letter to Prime Minister Sharon," April 14, 2004.


Emad Mekay, "Iraq Was Invaded 'to Protect Israel' - US Official," Asia Times Online, March 31, 2004. Zelikow also served with Rice on the National Security Council when George H. W. Bush was President, and co-authored a book with her on German reunification. He was also one of the principal authors of the second Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, the most comprehensive official presentation of the so-called Bush Doctrine.

Following publication of our original article, Zelikow challenged our use of this quotation and claimed that we had taken his remarks out of context. In particular, he suggested that he had been speaking primarily about the first Gulf War in 1990-91, and not about the 2003 war that was then being contemplated. A full record of his remarks shows that this claim is false and that he was clearly referring to the debate on whether the United States should launch a preventive war against Iraq in 2002-03. For the exchange, which includes the text of the key passages of his September 2002 remarks, see the "Letters" section of The London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 10 (May 25, 2006).


Gideon Alon, "Sharon to Panel: Iraq is Our Biggest Danger," Ha'aretz, August 13, 2002. At a White House press conference with President Bush on October 16, 2002, Sharon said: "I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the friendship and cooperation. And as far as I remember, as we look back towards many years now, I think that we never had such relations with any President of the United States as we have with you, and we never had such cooperation in everything as we have with the current administration." For a transcript of the press conference, see "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Sharon to White House; Question and Answer Session with the Press," U.S. Department of State, October 16, 2002. Also see Kaiser, "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy."


Marc Perelman, "Iraqi Move Puts Israel in Lonely U.S. Corner," Forward, September 20, 2002. This
article begins, "Saddam Hussein's surprise acceptance of 'unconditional' United Nations weapons inspections put Israel on the hot seat this week, forcing it into the open as the only nation actively supporting the Bush administration's goal of Iraqi regime change." Peres became so frustrated with the UN process in the following months that in mid-February 2003 he lashed out at the French by questioning France's status as a permanent member of the Security Council. "Peres Questions France Permanent Status on Security Council," Ha'aretz, February 20, 2003. On a visit to Moscow in late September 2002, Sharon made it clear to Russian President Putin, who was leading the charge for new inspections, that "the time when these inspectors could have been effective has passed." Herb Keinon, "Sharon to Putin: Too Late for Iraq Arms Inspection," The Jerusalem Post, October 1, 2002.


162 Indeed, a February 2003 poll reported that 77.5 percent of Israeli Jews wanted the United States to attack Iraq. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, "Peace Index: Most Israelis Support the Attack on Iraq," Ha'aretz, March 6, 2003. Regarding Kuwait, a public opinion poll released in March 2003 found that 89.6 percent of Kuwaitis favored the impending war against Iraq. James Morrison, "Kuwaitis Support War," The Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2002; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Imagining the Liberation of Iraq," The Jerusalem Post, November 18, 2001.


164 See Dan Izenberg, "Foreign Ministry Warns Israeli War Talk Fuels US Anti-Semitism," The Jerusalem Post, March 10, 2003, which makes clear that "the Foreign Ministry has received reports from the US" telling Israelis to cool their jets because "the US media" is portraying Israel as "trying to goad the administration into war." There is also evidence that Israel itself was concerned about being seen as driving American policy toward Iraq. See Benn, "PM Urging U.S. Not to Delay Strike"; Perelman, "Iraq Move Puts Israel in Lonely U.S. Corner." Finally, in late September 2002, a group of political consultants known as the "Israel Project" told pro-Israel leaders in the United States "to keep quiet while the Bush administration pursues a possible war with Iraq." Dana Milbank, "Group Urges Pro-Israel Leaders Silence on Iraq," The Washington Post, November 27, 2002.


168 Just before the U.S. military invaded Iraq, Congressman James P. Moran (D-VA) created a stir when he said, "If it were not for the strong support of the Jewish community for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this." Spencer S. Hsu, "Moran Said Jews Are Pushing War," The Washington Post, March 11, 2003. Moran misspoke, however, because there was not widespread support for the war in the Jewish community. He should have said, "If it were not for the strong support of the neoconservatives and the leadership of the Israel lobby for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this."


170 It is no exaggeration to say that in the wake of 9/11, the neoconservatives were not just determined, but were obsessed with removing Saddam from power. As one senior administration figure put it in January 2003, "I do believe certain people have grown theological about this. It's almost a religion — that it will be the end of our society if we don't take action now." Kessler, "U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past." Kessler also describes Colin Powell returning from White House meetings on Iraq, "rolling his eyes" and saying, "Jeez, what a fixation about Iraq." Bob Woodward reports in Plan of Attack (Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 410, that Kenneth Adelman "said he had worried to death as time went on and support seemed to wane that there would be no war." Also see ibid., pp. 164-165.

171 The first letter (January 26, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and can be found on its website. The second letter (February 19, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf and can be found on the Iraq Watch website. Also see the May 29, 1998, letter to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott written under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and found on its website. The neoconservatives, it should be emphasized, advocated invading Iraq to topple Saddam. See "The End of Containment," The Weekly Standard, December 1, 1997, pp. 13-14; Zalmay M. Khalizad and Paul Wolfowitz, "Overthrow Him," in ibid., pp. 14-15; Frederick W. Kagan, "Not by Air Alone," in ibid., pp. 15-16.


173 One might think from the publicity and controversy surrounding two books published in 2004 — Richard Clarke's Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004) and Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill (Simon and Schuster, 2004) — that Bush and Cheney were deeply interested in toppling Saddam, just as Bill Clinton and Al Gore had been. But there is no evidence in the public record showing that Bush and Cheney were seriously contemplating war against Iraq before 9/11. In fact, Bush made it clear to Bob Woodward that he was not thinking about going to war against Saddam before 9/11. See Plan of Attack, p. 12. Also see Nicholas Lehmann, "The Iraq Factor," The New Yorker, Vol. 76, issue 43 (January 22, 2001), pp. 34-48; Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Meyers, "Bush Administration Warns Iraq on Weapons Programs," The New York Times, January 23, 2001. And Cheney had defended the decision not to go to Baghdad throughout the 1990s and during the 2000 campaign. See Timothy Noah, "Dick Cheney, Dove," Slate.com, October 16, 2002; "Calm after Desert Storm," An Interview with Dick Cheney, Policy Review, No. 65 (Summer 1993). In short, even though the neoconservatives held important positions in the Bush administration, they were unable to generate much enthusiasm for attacking Iraq before 9/11. Thus, The New York Times reported in March 2001 that "some Republicans" were complaining that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz "are failing to live up to their pre-election advocacy of stepping up efforts to overthrow President Hussein." At the same time, a Washington Times editorial asked, "Have Hawks Become Doves?" See Jane Perlez, "Capitol Hawks Seek Tougher Line on Iraq," The New York Times, March 7, 2001; "Have Hawks Become Doves?" The Washington Times, March 8, 2001.

174 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 25-26. Wolfowitz was so insistent on conquering Iraq that five days later Cheney had to tell him to "stop agitating for targeting Saddam." Page, "Showdown with Saddam." According to one Republican lawmaker, he "was like a parrot bringing [Iraq] up all the time. It was getting on the President's nerves." Elliot and Carney, "First Stop, Iraq." Woodward describes Wolfowitz as "like a drum that would not stop." Plan of Attack, p. 22.

175 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 1-44.

177 The New York Times reported shortly after 9/11 that, "Some senior administration officials, led by Paul D. Wolfowit … and I. Lewis Libby … are pressing for the earliest and broadest military campaign against not only the Osama bin Laden network in Afghanistan, but also against other suspected terrorist bases in Iraq and in Lebanon's Bekaa region." Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation," The New York Times, September 20, 2001. Also see William Safire, "Phony War II," The New York Times, November 28, 2002. Woodward succinctly describes Libby's influence in Plan of Attack (pp. 48-49): "Libby had three formal titles. He was chief of staff to Vice President Cheney; he was also national security adviser to the vice president; and he was finally an assistant to President Bush. It was a trifecta of positions probably never held before by a single person. Scooter was a power center unto himself …. Libby was one of only two people who were not principals to attend the National Security Council meetings with the president and the separate principals meetings chaired by Rice." Also see ibid., pp 50-51, 288-292, 300-301, 490-410; Bumiller and Schmitt, "On the Job and at Home"; Karen Kwiatkowski, "The New Pentagon Papers," Salon.com, March 10, 2004; Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation," The New York Times, September 20, 2001. On Libby's relationship to Israel, an article in Forward reports that "Israelis official liked Libby. They described him as an important contact who was accessible, genuinely interested in Israel-related issues and very sympathetic to their cause." Ori Nir, "Libby Played Leading Role on Foreign Policy Decisions," Forward, November 4, 2005.

178 This letter was published in The Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001.


184 The Office of Special Plans relied heavily on information from Ahmed Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles and it had close links with various Israeli sources. Indeed, The Guardian reports that it "forged close ties to a parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon's office in Israel specifically to bypass Mossad and provide the Bush administration with more alarmist reports on Saddam's Iraq than Mossad was prepared to authorize." Julian Borger, "The Spies Who Pushed for War," The Guardian, July 17, 2003.

185 See, for example, Douglas J. Feith, "The Inner Logic of Israel's Negotiations: Withdrawal Process, Not Peace Process," Middle East Quarterly, March 1996. For useful discussions of Feith's views, see Jeffrey
Goldberg, "A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It," The New Yorker, Vol. 81, issue 12 (May 9, 2005), pp. 36-41; Jim Lobe, "Losing Feith, or is the Bush Team Shedding Its Sharper Edges?" The Daily Star, January 31, 2005; James J. Zogby, "A Dangerous Appointment: Profile of Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense under Bush," Middle East Information Center, April 18, 2001; "Israeli Settlements: Legitimate, Democraticallly Mandated, Vital to Israel's Security and, Therefore, in U.S. Interest," The Center for Security Policy, Transition Brief No. 96-T 130, December 17, 1996. Note that the title of the latter piece, which was published by an organization in the lobby, says that what is in Israel's interest is therefore in America's national interest. In "Losing Feith," Lobe writes: "In 2003, when Feith, who was standing in for Rumsfeld at an interagency 'Principals' Meeting' on the Middle East, concluded his remarks on behalf of the Pentagon, according to the Washington insider newsletter, the American Jewish community and the Iraqi opposition had for years "taken pains to conceal" the links between them. "Mutual Wariness: AIPAC Latino Wire.com, April 25, 2003. Nathan Guttman reports that "the American Jewish community and the Israeli ambassador'."

The "Clean Break" study was prepared for The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem and published in June 1996. A copy can be found on the Institute's web site.

180 The "Clean Break" study was prepared for The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem and published in June 1996. A copy can be found on the Institute's web site.


188 "Rally Unites Anguished Factions under Flag of 'Stand with Israel'," Forward, April 19, 2002; "Forward 50," Forward, November 15, 2002.


187 Nir, "FBI Probe." On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, who is now the executive editor of The New York Times, wrote: "The idea that this war is about Israel is persistent and more widely held than you think." Keller, "Is It Good for the Jews?" The New York Times, March 8, 2003.

190 According to Feith's former law partner, L. Marc Zell, Chalabi also promised to re-build the pipeline that once ran from Haifa in Israel to Mosul in Iraq. See John Dizard, "How Ahmed Chalabi Conned the Neocons," Salon.com, May 4, 2004. In mid-June 2003, Benjamin Netanyahu announced that, "It won't be long before you will see Iraqi oil flowing to Haifa." Reuters, "Netanyahu Says Iraq-Israel Oil Line Not Pipe-Dream," Ha'aretz, June 20, 2003. Of course, this did not happen and it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.


192 Nir, "FBI Probe." On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, who is now the executive editor of The New York Times, wrote: "The idea that this war is about Israel is persistent and more widely held than you think." Keller, "Is It Good for the Jews?" The New York Times, March 8, 2003.


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200 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, *Differentiated Containment*, p. 130.

201 For example, *The Jerusalem Post* noted in an editorial (September 9, 2002) that "according to Middle East expert Bernard Lewis, a post-Saddam Iraq is one that would be more likely to make peace with Israel, defang Arab radicalism, and perhaps even catalyze revolutionary forces in present-day Iran." Similarly, Michael Ledeen wrote on August 6, 2002 in *National Review Online* ("Scowcroft Strikes Out"), "If ever there was a region that richly deserved being cauldronized, it is the Middle East today. If we wage the war effectively, we will bring down the terror regimes in Iraq, Iran and Syria, and either bring down the Saudi monarchy or force it to abandon its global assembly line to indoctrinate young terrorists." On August 19, Joshua Muravchik argued in *The New York Times* ("Democracy's Quiet Victory"), "Change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world." Also see Marina Ottaway et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East," *Policy Brief #20* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2002).


203 Benn, "Background." Also, *The New York Times* reported that Haley gave a speech in Munich in February 2003 in which he said, "The shock waves emerging from post-Saddam Baghdad could have wide-ranging effects in Tehran, Damascus and in Ramallah." The *Times* article went on to say that Israel "is hoping that once Saddam Hussein is dispensed with, the dominoes will start to tumble. According to this hope … moderates and reformers throughout the region would be encouraged to put new pressure on their own governments, not excepting the Palestinian Authority of Yasir Arafat." Bennet, "Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region." This same theme is reflected in a *Forward* article from early March 2003, which said that "Israel's top political, military and economic echelons have come to regard the looming war as a virtual deus ex machina that will turn the political and economic tables and extricate Israel from its current morass." Shalev, "Jerusalem Frets." Finally, this line of thinking was apparent in former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's previously discussed September 4, 2002, op-ed in *The New York Times*. Barak maintained that "putting an end to Saddam Hussein's regime will change the geopolitical landscape of the Arab world." He claimed, "An Arab world without Saddam Hussein would enable many from this generation [leaders about to come into power] to embrace the gradual democratic opening that some of the Persian Gulf states and Jordan have begun to enjoy." Barak also maintained that toppling Saddam would "create an opening for forward movement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."


Moore, "Sharon Asks U.S."


Nir, "Sharon Aide." Also see Perelman, "Behind Warnings." In their efforts to demonize Syria and bait the United States into attacking it, Israelis have said that Damascus was harboring high-level Iraqis from Saddam's regime and, even worse, hiding Iraq's WMD. Perelman, "Behind Warnings"; Laurie Copans, "Israeli Military Boss Claims Iraq Had Chemical Weapons," Associated Press news release, April 26, 2004; Ira Stoll, "Saddam's WMD Moved to Syria, An Israeli Says," The New York Sun, December 15, 2005; Idem, "Iraq's WMD Secreted in Syria, Sada Says," The New York Sun, January 26, 2006. In August 2003, when a suicide truck bomber blew up UN headquarters in Baghdad, Israel's UN ambassador caused a diplomatic spat by suggesting that Syria had provided the truck, thereby implying that Syria was partly responsible. Michael Casey, "Israeli Ambassador Believes Truck Used in UN Bombing Came from Syria," Associated Press news release, August 21, 2003; "Israeli Envoy Links Syria to UN Blast, Stirs Flap," Reuters news release, August 21, 2003. Itamar Rabinovich, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, told Seymour Hersh that he "wondered ... whether, given the quality of their sources, the Syrians had had advance information about the September 11th plot — and failed to warn the United States." Hersh, "The Syrian Bet." There was little evidence to support these charges, but Israel's willingness to make them shows how eager they were to get the United States embroiled with yet another Arab regime.

Syria had been in the lobby's gun sights well before 9/11. In fact, Syria, not Iraq, was the main target in the "Clean Break" study that Fethi, Perle and Wurmser wrote for Netanyahu in 1996. And Daniel Pipes and Ziad Abdelnour, the head of the U.S. Committee for a Free Lebanon (USCFL), had co-authored a 2000 report calling for the United States to use military threats to force Syria to remove its troops from Lebanon, get rid of any WMD it might have, and stop supporting terrorism. ("Ending Syria's Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role," Report of the Middle East Study Group, Middle East Forum, May 2000.) The USCFL is a close cousin of the lobby, and it includes numerous neoconservatives (Abrams, Fethi, Ledeen, Perle and Wurmser) among its "official core supporters." Jordan Green, "Neocons Dream of Lebanon," ZNet, July 23, 2003; David R. Sands, "Hawks Recycle Arguments for Iraq War against Syria," The Washington Times, April 16, 2003. Except for Ledeen, they all signed the 2000 report, as did pro-Israel Congressmen Eliot Engel (D-NY), another core supporter of USCFL.


Quoted in Robin Wright, "U.S. Insists Syria Alter Its Course," The Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2003. Also see Martin Indyk's and Dennis Ross's tough rhetoric about Syria in Hersh, "The Syrian Bet."


DeYoung, "U.S. Toughens Stance." There was a story in Ha'aretz ("NY Congressman Says Will Push Bill to Pressure Syria") on August 19, 2003, which reported that Engel had just met with Sharon in his Jerusalem Office for 90 minutes, and the Israeli leader had endorsed Engel's efforts to push the Syria Accountability Act. Regard-


218 Quoted in Alan Sipress, "Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat," The New York Times, May 6, 2003. In early June, 'regime change' in Iran has become much more intense since early May and already has borne substantial fruit."  

217 Two articles that appeared in Forward after Baghdad fell describe the driving forces behind the new U.S. policy toward Syria. In a piece in mid-April, the author noted: "A sudden flurry of U.S. warnings to Syria in recent days indicates that Washington has undertaken what Israel and its supporters here have been urging for months: a comprehensive reassessment of Syrian ruler Bashar Assad."  


212 "Ambassador to U.S. Calls for 'Regime Change' in Iran, Syria," Ha'aretz, April 28, 2003. Ten days later The New York Times reported that Washington was growing increasingly concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions, and that there is "a lot of hammering from the Israelis for us to take this position seriously."  

211 In late May 2003, Inter Press Service reported that, "The neo-cons' efforts to now focus US attention on 'regime change' in Iran has become much more intense since early May and already has borne substantial fruit." Jim Lobe, "U.S. Neo-Cons Move Quickly on Iran," Inter Press Service, May 28, 2003. In early June, Forward reported, "Neoconservatives inside and outside the administration have been urging an active effort to promote regime change in Tehran. Reports of possible covert actions have surfaced in recent weeks." Mar Perelman, "Pentagon Team on Iran Comes under Fire," Forward, June 6, 2003. Also see idem, "White House Is Aiming to Raise Iranian Nukes at U.N. Security Council," Forward, May 9, 2003; Idem, "New Front Sets Sights on Toppling Iran Regime," Forward, May 16, 2003. Finally, the lobby has established close relations with Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah of Iran. He is even reported to have had meetings with Netanyahu and Sharon. This relationship is similar to the lobby's relationship with Ahmed Chalabi. Specifically, pro-Israel forces promote Pahlavi, and in return, he makes clear that if he comes to power in Iran, it will have good relations with Israel. Connie Bruck, "Exiles: How Iran's Expatriates Are Gaming the Nuclear Threat," The New Yorker, Vol. 82, issue 2 (March 6, 2006), pp. 48-63; Perelman, "New Front."
The flyer advertising the conference, which was entitled "The Future of Iran: Mullahcracy, Democracy and the War on Terror," can be found at a number of sites on the web. Also see Green, "Neocons Dream of Lebanon"; Lobe, "U.S. Neo-Cons Move Quickly."

William Kristol, "The End of the Beginning," *The Weekly Standard*, February 12, 2003. Others writing articles at the time include Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, who wrote a piece on May 20 for *The Jerusalem Post* entitled, "Turn up the Pressure on Iran." They called for the Bush administration to support the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a terrorist organization based in Iraq that was bent on overthrowing the ayatollahs running Iran. Lawrence Kaplan argued in the *New Republic* ("Iranamok") on June 9 that the United States needed to get tougher with Iran over its nuclear programs, which he feared were further along than most American policymakers recognized. Michael Ledeen, one of the leading hawks on Iran, wrote in *The National Review Online* ("The Others") on April 4: "There is no more time for diplomatic 'solutions.' We will have to deal with the terror masters, here and now. Iran, at least, offers us the possibility of a memorable victory, because the Iranian people openly loathe the regime, and will enthusiastically combat it, if only the United States supports them in their just struggle."


