THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT IS IN AMERICA’S NATIONAL INTEREST

REJECTING IT WOULD ISOLATE US AND PUT US ON A SLIPPERY SLOPE TOWARD COSTLY WAR

We are a group of national security scholars, including all the living signatories of a New York Times ad in September 2002 that warned that “War with Iraq is not in the American national interest.” (See IRScholars.weebly.com). We believe that the nation is now at a similar juncture and that the nuclear agreement with Iran makes war less likely and furthers American interests.

- Under the agreement it would take Iran much longer than it would today—at least a year—to produce a bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium from its declared facilities. Any move in this direction would be immediately detected.
- The inspection arrangements would make secret enrichment unlikely because they cover the entire chain of production, from uranium mines to the importing of materials that could be used to build centrifuges.
- Although the probability of detection of secret sites cannot be 100%, Iran could not be confident that its cheating would go undetected. Clearly, the probability of detecting Iranian secret facilities is much higher with the agreement’s enhanced inspections than under current circumstances.
- The “snap-back” provisions mean that Iran could not block the re-imposition of sanctions, nor could Russia or China.
- If the US rejects the agreement, it is unlikely that our allies, let alone Russia and China, would maintain sanctions, making the threat of war the only remaining American tool to keep Iran from a bomb.
- After ten years Iran will be allowed to build larger and more efficient enrichment facilities. But even if the regime continues to be malign, inspections will remain in place and the production of highly enriched uranium would quickly be detected, allowing the US to take all appropriate actions.
- We recognize that the regime in Tehran is repressive and pursues dangerous policies, but the nuclear deal does not prevent us from countering them.

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